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Chapter 1
Introduction
In many markets the firms’ pricing decisions cannot be predicted. That is, firms
randomly switch between low and high prices. Such behavior typically arises
when firms have some pricing power over some consumers, but compete with
other firms for other consumers. That is, in the equilibrium there is a tradeoff
for firms between low prices, which increase the expected sales, and high prices,
which increase the profit per expected sale. Hence, some prices can yield the
same expected profits and consequently more prices can be optimal.
The pricing power of firms can have several origins. In this work, we want to
concentrate on two important sources: information incompleteness of consumers
and advertising.
In most consumer markets, we find a large number of competing retailers.
Potential customers generally do not know the prices of firms in advance and
have to visit the stores to collect prices. However, visiting all firms can be
extremely costly. Therefore, (at least some) consumers may prefer to remain
incompletely informed if these costs are substantially large. Hence, the prices
observed by the consumers generally differ among them. Consequently, there
are consumers who have only observed large prices and some who have observed
lower prices. Moreover, if the consumers have different costs of acquiring the
price information, the number of observed prices differs among them. Therefore,
firms cannot exploit the consumers who have only observed large prices by
charging a large price without risking to loose those who have observed lower
prices and thus random pricing can occur. In Chapter 2 we analyze a model
in which consumers are ex-ante uninformed about the prices set by the firms.
Acquiring the price information is costly for consumers. In contrast to the
existing literature, we allow firms to offer goods of different quality and to
be different in costs. We analyze an equilibrium in which both firms have
positive profits and use set prices randomly. Moreover, we want to clarify if this
9
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equilibrium can also exist if one firm has a (cost) advantage. That is, we will
find condition for which it is optimal for the firm with the advantage to charge
prices so high that the competitor is not driven out of the market. Furthermore,
there is the possibility that a high quality good is offered for a lower price than
a low quality good. We find conditions for this to be possible.
Firms spend a lot of their budgets on advertising. This action increases the
revenues of the firms by either increasing the (expected) sales or the price of the
sales (or both). Through the spread of the internet and through the evolution
of the so called gatekeepers, it has become easier (and cheaper) for firms to offer
their products to a larger number of potential consumers. That is, gatekeepers
create virtual market places in one country or in a group of countries. Firms
can pay a fee to the gatekeeper to advertise their product and its price on the
website operated by gatekeepers (or in other words, they pay an entry fee to
sell their product on a virtual market place). More precisely, firms advertise
to sell to more consumers. The potential customers who use the website have
access to price lists and purchase the good which gives them the highest utility.
Therefore, there is price competition for the consumers on the virtual market
place. However, not all customers use the gatekeeper’s website. Thus, they buy
the good in local (physical) stores. Since the number of firms is limited in the
local market or the costs of visiting a store is large, the firms have some pricing
power over the non-users. Consequently, random pricing can occur. In Chapter
3, we analyze two local markets with one firm in each local market. However, the
firms can compete for a fraction of consumers through advertising their prices on
a gatekeeper’s website. The existing literature has ignored that the firms which
offer their products on these website cannot be treated as symmetric, since there
are a lot of different firms selling on the virtual market places, e.g. large retailers
chains and small shops with few employees. This raises the further questions. If
one firm has a disadvantage, the gatekeeper might be able to eliminate that firm
from the virtual market by charging high fees. This eliminates price competition
too. Moreover, in our model, one good is socially preferred and the gatekeeper’s
presence can increase the consumption of this good and thus increase welfare.
To analyze this, we establish an equilibrium in which firms are allowed to be
asymmetric. We analyze the reaction of the agents on changes in a measure for
asymmetry in the market. Moreover, we compare the expected profits of the
gatekeeper and the welfare for different measures of asymmetry.
Another aim of advertising is to change the valuations of the receivers. More
precisely, a firm designs its advertising in such a way that the receivers’ will-
ingness to pay for the firm’s good increases relative to the goods of the com-
petitors. In other words, firms advertise to gain pricing power. However, not
all consumers receive the same advertisements or are equally affected by each
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advertisement they receive. Consequently, consumers are heterogenous in val-
uations after having received the advertisements. Thus, firms may not exploit
their pricing power but use random pricing instead. In Chapter 4, we set up a
model in which firms advertise to increase consumers’ valuation for their goods.
Moreover, firms are assumed to be price setters. We will establish and compare
equilibria in four different scenarios. Two of those scenarios are extreme cases.
Firms choose both strategic dimensions, their advertising intensities and their
prices, noncooperatively or choose both actions to maximize industry profits. In
the other two scenarios firms behave semicollusive. That is, they either choose
their advertising intensities cooperatively and compete in prices or they set
prices cooperatively and choose their advertising intensities noncooperatively.
First, we analyze the model when advertising has no spillover effects. That is,
we compare the equilibrium strategies, the expected profits and the welfare on
the equilibrium paths. In a second step, we generalize the model by introduc-
ing spillovers of advertising. That is, a receiver of an advertisement is likely
to change her willingness to pay not for the advertising firm’s good only, but
for all goods in the market. We analyze the effect of the spillovers on strate-
gies, profits and welfare. More precisely, we examine whether cooperation is
always welfare deterring or whether there exist ranges of spillovers in which
semicollusion should be enforced by antitrust authorities.
All proofs can be found in the appendices of the chapters.
12 RANDOM PRICING, INFORMATION AND ADVERTISING
Chapter 2
Vertically Differentiated
Goods and Sequential
Consumer Search
2.1 Introduction
Most of the consumer search literature is concentrated on search for homogenous
goods. They find equilibria in which firms randomize their prices over an interval
in order that uninformed consumers and competing firms cannot predict it.
Consequently, the analyzed markets exhibit price dispersion for a homogenous
goods (see for example Stahl (1989)).
In the majority of these studies, markets are analyzed in which there exists
a homogenous good of a known quality and the consumers search for prices.
However, in many markets there are a lot of horizontally or vertically differen-
tiated products. One only has to consider markets for electronic gadgets. Here
we find a large number of different designs for a certain products as well as we
find products, which differ in the number of functions, in their power, velocity,
etc. When consumers start to search for products, which satisfy certain desires,
they might not be sure which quality they eventually will buy. Therefore, incor-
porating differentiated products into consumer search theory can shed light on
features which cannot be analyzed by models assuming a homogenous product.
A motivating observation can easily be made by studying price offers for ver-
tically differentiated goods on websites which compare prices, e.g. www.idealo.co.uk,
www.geizhals.de, etc. On these websites retailers quote their prices and users
can costlessly access these price lists. It is not difficult to find products which
price ranges overlap even if they are vertically differentiated, e.g. processors.
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Moreover, one can actually find vertically differentiated processors of the same
manufacturer, which have overlapping price supports.1 If we assume that all
consumers prefer later products, we can immediately conclude that it is strictly
dominated for a consumer to buy the older good at the highest posted price, if
the supports are overlapping and there is perfect information. Hence, setting
this price can only be optimal if a firm offers the good to uninformed consumer,
too. Therefore, incomplete information is a necessary condition for overlapping
price distribution to be present.
Most studies in the consumer search literature concentrate on price search.
That is, the consumer knows the quality the different shops offer. They are only
uncertain about the price quoted by the firms. In this paper we want to adopt
this assumption. Hence, we assume that the customers can distinguish the
firms by their quality. Motivating this, one should consider, that the consumers
have previous experience in the market. That is, they know that a certain
firm always offers higher quality products and the other one offers low-quality
products. It is much more obvious if some firms in the market are reputed to be
discounters offering no-name products and others are reputed to be traditional
retailers offering brands (assuming that the firms producing the brands are more
experienced in making certain products and can therefore be expected to offer
a higher quality).
The interaction of competing substitutes raises new questions to consumer
search theory. Is there an equilibrium where all substitutes make positive sales,
even if consumers have homogenous preferences and one good has a relative
advantage (i.e. one firm is more profitable and hence the good is the socially
desirable good)? How does the pricing strategy of the firms in this equilibrium
look like? Does there exist an equilibrium in mixed pricing strategies? Is it
possible that a substitute which is preferable over all other goods is offered for
a lower price than its competing goods? That is, are the supports of the pricing
strategies overlapping?
In an empirical study, Wildenbeest (2009) derives a pricing rule for firms
offering different vertically differentiated goods to consumers who are involved
in simultaneous search. He shows that firms with fixed qualities randomize their
prices over different supports if consumers know which firm offers which quality.
A necessary condition for the firms to have positive profits is that the average
prices reflect the product difference. However, a shortcoming of Wildenbeest’s
model (2009) is that the maximum attainable profits per unit sold is constant
1Take for example shops offering Intel processors on the price-search engine www.idealo.de
on the 18.August 2009. The Intel Core 2 Quad Q9400 Tray’s was offered in a price range was
from 153.95 Euro to 202.94 Euro. However, the better Intel Core 2 Quad 9550 Tray’s price
range is from 185.86 Euro to 287.08 Euro. Hence, the prices ranges overlap in the interval
185.86 Euro and 202.94 Euro.
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over firms, i.e. there are no relative advantages. This gives rise to the existence
of a symmetric equilibrium in utility levels. Furthermore, Wildenbeest (2009)
depicts the results of a simulation in which the price distributions for differ-
ent qualities overlap. However, this is only a byproduct of the paper and not
analyzed. In contrast to Wildenbeest (2009), our model allows for different prof-
itability of the firms and it offers an intuitive explanations for the overlapping
supports.
In an earlier empirical paper, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) derive optimal
strategies for firms offering vertically differentiated products to homogenous
consumers who search sequentially. In contrast to Wildenbeest (2009) and our
model, the consumers do not know which firm offers which quality and the
optimal pricing rules of the firms are in pure strategies.
In another study, Anderson and Renault (1999) examine a horizontally dif-
ferentiated market with sequential search. They found that prices decrease with
the degree of product differentiation. The reason for this is, that the consumers
intensify search as the product’s difference becomes larger if the heterogeneity of
tastes of the consumers is large enough. Consequently, the competition between
firms increases. However, we do not model how the firms choose the degree of
differentiation. In the equilibrium of our model the firms set prices such that the
visiting consumers buy the product and do not continue search. Hence, search
does not intensify with the degree of differentiation, which is basically a result
of homogeneity of the consumers utility function.
We set up a model, in which homogenous consumers search sequentially
for prices of two vertically differentiated products. Each of the two goods is
offered by one firm. We assume that the consumers know the quality offered by
each shop ex-ante. First, the two firms simultaneously set their prices. Then,
the consumers choose which shop they visit first. After the consumers have
visited the shop and have observed the price of the product, the individual
decides whether to continue search. First, we refer to a well-known benchmark
case in which all customers are perfectly informed about the prices charged.
Hence, the firms are involved in Bertrand-competition. We will show, that
there exist pure-strategy equilibria. Furthermore, at most one firm can make
positive profits. If consumers are incompletely informed, we show the existence
of a particular equilibrium in mixed-strategies. In this equilibrium, the firms
draw prices randomly from an interval according to a stochastic rule. In this
equilibrium, each firm attracts a fraction of the non-shoppers. This equilibrium
can exist even if one firm has a large advantage. A necessary condition is
that search costs of the consumers are sufficiently large, given that consumers
have positive expected payoffs. Interestingly, in this mixed-strategy equilibrium
the price distributions overlap if search costs are sufficiently large and if the
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products are not too differentiated. Furthermore, the pure-strategy equilibrium
persists under incomplete information if the search costs are sufficiently small
and the fraction of informed consumers as well as the product differentiation is
sufficiently large.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 analyzes a reference case with complete information. Section 4 is the
heart of the paper and analyzes the sequential search model. We establish the
existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that such an
equilibrium can arise even if the relative advantage is large. Moreover, we find
condition under which the supports of the pricing strategies overlap. Ultimately,
we establish an alternative equilibrium which exists, even if the other equilib-
rium fails to exist. Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes. The proofs
can be found in Appendix A.
2.2 The Model
Assume two firms i = H,L and a unit mass of risk-neutral consumers with unit
demand. Let firm H to have constant marginal costs, cH , and firm L to have
constant marginal costs, cL, with cL ≤ cH . The firms are assumed to set prices
simultaneously, pi ∈ [ci,∞), such that they maximize their expected profits.
Let Fi(·) denote the c.d.f. of the price distribution for the firm offering good i.
Moreover, we denote the lower and upper bound by p
i
and p¯i, respectively.
Consumers are assumed to buy one good in the market or leave the market
without consuming. Moreover, they are homogenous in preferences and prefer
good H over good L. Thus, we have vertically differentiation in the market.
Hence, the utility of consuming good i is given by
U(i) = Vi − pi, (2.1)
whereas Vi denotes the utility gained by consuming good i with VL ≤ VH2 and
pi is the price paid for this good. The utility of not buying anything is assumed
to be zero.
Assume that the consumers are not fully informed about the firms. To get
information about a firm‘s quotation, the consumers have to visit the firm.
This search for prices is costly and the costs will be denoted by s. This can
be understood as the costs of fuel or public transport to get to a shop plus the
opportunity costs of time. Furthermore, as Stahl (1989), we assume that only a
fraction 1− λ of consumers, to which we will refer as non-shoppers, has search
2Since it could be the case, that cH = cL and VH = VL, the homogenous goods case is
contained in the analysis, too.
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costs s > 0. Analogous to the literature, we assume that visiting the first shop
is costless.3 However, the non-shoppers have to decide which shop to visit first.
Let µ denote the fraction of non-shoppers who visit the low-quality firm first.
For simplicity assume that there is perfect recall and that the non-shoppers can
costlessly return to previously visited firms. The other fraction λ of consumers,
to which we will refer as shoppers, like shopping or is able to use price search
engines and these consumers are assumed to have no search costs.
To keep the problem interesting, we assume that firms can profitably sell
to non-shoppers even if they actually search. That is, VH − cH − s > 0 and
VL − cL − s > 0 hold.
2.3 Complete Information
In this section, we derive a reference case in which both prices and qualities are
observable for firms and consumers. Hence under these assumption, the firms
and the consumers are completely informed. Three cases can arise:
Proposition 2.1. There exists a pure-strategy equilibrium under complete in-
formation. That is,
(i) if VH − cH > VL − cL, then pH = cL + VH − VL, pL = cL, µ = 0 and all
shoppers buy at the high-quality firm,
(ii) if VH − cH < VL − cL, then pL = cH − (VH − VL), pH = cH , µ = 1 and
all shoppers buy at the low-quality firm,
(iii) if VH − cH = VL − cL, then pL = cL and pH = cH for any µ and any
decision of the shoppers.
In the complete information case, the firm which offers the best utility-price
pair sells to all consumers whereas the other firm sells no units. Hence, at
least one firm has an incentive to lower the price given the price is larger than
the marginal costs. Consequently, at least one firm charges a price equal to
its marginal costs. The results stated in Proposition 2.1 suggests that it is
reasonable to have the following definition.
Definition 2.1. One firm has a relative advantage if VH − cH 6= VL − cL.
Intuitively, the maximum attainable profits per unit sold are larger for the
firm with the relative advantage than those of the competitor.
3This assumption is commonly made in the consumer search literature. Assuming that the
first search is costly complicates the analysis and does not give more insights.
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In a related article of Singh and Vives (1984), who assume a duopoly in
which the firms are involved in Bertrand competition, both firms are able to sell
for prices larger than marginal costs. However, this is not possible under our
assumptions, since we supposed unit demand, meaning that the costumer buys
either the low-quality good or the high-quality good and not a combination of
both. In Singh and Vives (1984) the customers have concave utility functions
and combine the consumption of both goods, even if they are substitutes.
2.4 Incomplete Information
We consider a situation in which the prices quoted by the firms are private
information and can only be observed by visiting the firms. The qualities offered
by the firms are assumed to be publicly known, as well as the valuations and
production costs.
The objective of this section is to establish the existence of an equilibrium in
which both firms have positive expected profits. However, such an equilibrium
cannot be in pure pricing strategies, because deterministic strategies make the
consumers completely informed about the prices charged and hence the reference
case arises. Hence, in such an equilibrium there must be necessarily at least one
firm which mixes its prices such that price uncertainty prevails.
2.4.1 Which Firm Should Be Visited First?
In any equilibrium, the non-shoppers have to decide from which firm they receive
their costless price quotation. If the expected payoffs of visiting one firm is larger
than the expected payoffs of visiting the other firm, µ is a corner solution and
all the non-shoppers have a pure strategy. However, if the non-shoppers are
indifferent between visiting the high-quality firm and visiting the low-quality
firm, then interior solutions, µ ∈ (0, 1), can arise too. If so, the consumers
randomize their actions. If the rule is stochastic, the expected utility of visiting
the low-quality firm first necessarily equals the expected utility of visiting the
high-quality firm first.
2.4.2 The Reservation Price
Let the reservation price rL be defined as the price at which a non-shopper who
has visited the low-quality firm first is indifferent between buying the low-quality
good and continuing search. The individual can continue search by visiting the
high-quality firm. However, the costumer buys at the high-quality firm only if
the utility of buying there is larger than returning (costlessly) to the low-quality
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firm and buying for price rL. Hence, the reservation price must fulfill
VL − rL = VH − E[pH |VL − rL ≤ VH − pH ]− s. (2.2)
Analogously, we can define rH as the price at which an individual who has
visited the high-quality firm first is indifferent between buying the high-quality
good and continuing search. That is,
VH − rH = VL − E[pL|VH − rH ≤ VL − pL]− s. (2.3)
2.4.3 The Expected Profits
The expected profits of a firm consist of two components, namely sales to the
shoppers and sales to the non-shoppers. The expected profits for the firm offer-
ing the low quality good are given by
ΠL (p, FH(·)) = (p− cL) · [λ(1− FH(p+ VH − VL)) + µ(1− λ)] (2.4)
if p¯L ≤ rL and the expected profits of the firm offering the high quality good
are given by
ΠH (p, FL (·)) = (p− cH) · [λ(1− FL(p− (VH − VL)) + (1− µ)(1− λ)] (2.5)
if p¯H ≤ rH . The expected profits of the low-quality firm given in expression
(2.4), represents the expected profits of firm L if it sets its price equal to p,
given that the pricing strategy of the high-quality firm is FH . The first term
in the squared brackets represents the expected sales to shoppers, whereas the
second term represents the expected amount of sales to non-shoppers. Note,
that (1−FH(p+VH−VL)) represents the probability that the high-quality firm
sets the price higher than p+ VH − VL, which implies that the low-quality firm
sells to all shoppers if it sets price p. The expected profits of the high-quality
firm given in expression (2.5) can be explained analogously.
2.4.4 Equilibrium
We want to establish an equilibrium in which both firms have positive expected
profits.
Lemma 2.1. In any equilibrium in which both firms have positive expected
profits, p¯L = p¯H − (VH − VL) and p¯i = ri.
This Lemma states that in the equilibrium we want to examine, the upper
bounds of both supports are equal to the reservation prices. Note, that it also
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implies that rH − rL = VH − VL.
Lemma 2.2. In any equilibrium in which both firms sell to non-shoppers, non-
shoppers will not search beyond the first firm.
This means that all non-shopper stop after having visited the first firm.
From Lemma 2.1 the conditional expected price in (2.2) is simply given by
the unconditional price expectation
E[pH |VL − rL ≤ VH − pH ] =E[pH |VL − p¯L ≤ VH − pH ]
=E[pH |VL − p¯H + (VH − VL) ≤ VH − pH ]
=E[pH |pH ≤ p¯H ]
=E[pH ]
Similarly, the conditional expected price in (2.3) is simply given by the uncon-
ditional price expectation
E[pL|VH − rH ≤ VL − pL] = E[pL].
In any equilibrium it is crucial whether
E[VL − pL] T E[VH − pH ], (2.6)
because this determines from which shop the non-shoppers receive their costless
price quotation. The following Lemma rules out inequality in (2.6).
Lemma 2.3. In any equilibrium in which both firms have positive expected
profits, no firm attracts all non-shoppers.
Thus, we can draw our attention to equilibria in which both shops are equally
attractive to the consumers ex-ante. That is,
E[VL − pL] = E[VH − pH ]⇔ E[pH ]− E[pL] = VH − VL (2.7)
holds. Hence, the equilibrium which we want to analyze necessarily has the prop-
erty that the expected additional expenditures of consuming the high-quality
good equals the utility gain of consuming the high-quality good instead of the
low-quality good.
In the equilibrium we are going to analyze, all consumers visit at least one
firm, since visiting the first firm is costless. Furthermore, non-shoppers will buy
at the first firm visited, by Lemma 2.1, whereas the shoppers buy at the firm
which offers the highest utility.
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To ensure that both firms have positive expected profits, it suffices to verify,
that the expected profits of charging the upper bound are positive. That is
µ(1− λ)(p¯L − cL) > 0 and (2.8)
(1− µ)(1− λ)(p¯H − cH) > 0. (2.9)
To keep the notation simple, let ΦL(λ, µ) and ΦH(λ, µ) be defined as
0 ≤ ΦL(λ, µ) ≡
∫ 1
0
1− x
(1− x) + 1−λλ µ
dx ≤ 1 and (2.10)
0 ≤ ΦH(λ, µ) ≡
∫ 1
0
1− x
(1− x) + (1− µ) 1−λλ
dx ≤ 1. (2.11)
The expression Φi(λ, µ) can be seen as an inverse measure of firm i’s market
power, which arises from the informational incompleteness. It decreases in the
fraction of non-shoppers and in the fraction of non-shoppers who visit firm i
first.
We can establish the following equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2.
1. If
−1− ΦL(λ, 1)ΦL(λ, 1) <
VH − VL − (cH − cL)
s
<
1− ΦH(λ, 0)
ΦH(λ, 0)
then µ has an interior solution given by
1− ΦH(λ, µ)
ΦH(λ, µ)
− 1− ΦL(λ, µ)ΦL(λ, µ) =
VH − VL − (cH − cL)
s
(2.12)
and both firm’s expected profits are strictly positive.
2. If µ has an interior solution, µ∗, then a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists,
in which the atomless price distribution of the low-quality firm is given by
FL(pL) = 1−
(
s
ΦH(λ,µ∗) − pL − (VH − VL) + cH
pL + VH − VL − cH
(1− µ∗)(1− λ)
λ
)
(2.13)
on the support[
s
ΦH(λ, µ∗)
· (1− µ
∗) 1−λλ
1 + (1− µ∗) 1−λλ
− (VH − VL) + cH , cL + sΦL(λ, µ∗)
]
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and the atomless price distribution of the high-quality firm is given by
FH(pH) = 1−
(
s
ΦL(λ,µ∗) − pH + (VH − VL) + cL
pH − (VH − VL)− cL
µ∗(1− λ)
λ
)
(2.14)
on the support[
s
ΦL(λ, µ∗)
·
1−λ
λ µ
∗
1 + 1−λλ µ∗
+ VH − VL + cL, cH + sΦH(λ, µ∗)
]
.
2.4.5 A Special Case: No Relative Advantages
For illustrative reasons, we first want to deal with the special case of the equi-
librium described in Proposition 2.2. That is is the case in which
VH − cH = VL − cL.
holds. The right-hand side of equation (2.12) is zero. Hence, we have
1− ΦH(λ, µ∗)
ΦH(λ, µ∗)
= 1− ΦL(λ, µ
∗)
ΦL(λ, µ∗)
.
This implies that ΦH(λ, µ∗) = ΦL(λ, µ∗) ⇔ µ = 0.5, meaning that each firm
attracts half of the non-shoppers in equilibrium.
Since VH − VL − cH = −cL and ΦH(λ, 12 ) = ΦL(λ, 12 ) the equilibrium distri-
bution of the low-quality firm simplifies to
FL(pL) = 1−
(
cL + sΦL(λ, 12 ) − pL
2(pL − cL)
(1− λ)
λ
)
and since VH −VL+ cL = cH , the distribution of the high-quality firm simplifies
to
FH(pH) = 1−
(
cH + sΦH(λ, 12 ) − pH
2(pH − cH)
(1− λ)
λ
)
.
Note that p¯i = ci + sΦi(λ, 12 ) . These distribution functions are that derived by
Janssen et al. (2005) (with ci ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2).
Since µ = 12 holds, a mixed-strategy equilibrium always exists if there is no
relative advantage.
Corollary 2.1. If no firm has a relative advantage, both firms have the same
expected profits in the equilibrium established in Proposition 2.2.
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2.4.6 The Generic Case: Relative Advantages
Now, we want to consider the generic case, in which one firm has a relative
advantage, that is
VH − cH 6= VL − cL.
The Role of µ and Positive Profits for Both Firms
Since µ is endogenously determined by equation (2.12), it is in general a func-
tion of VH − cH − (VL − cL), s and λ. Therefore, we can write µ∗(VH − cH −
(VL − cL), s, λ). Since the non-shoppers cannot costlessly observe the realiza-
tion of prices at both shops, each of them has to decide which shop to visit first.
However, in the equilibrium of Proposition 2.2, the difference of the expected
prices is exactly VH −VL. This holds if the non-shoppers choose their first shop
randomly following µ∗.
Actually, the role of the decision which firm to visit first is similar to the
decision to participate in Janssen et al. (2005). In the equilibrium, the firms set
prices such that the consumer is indifferent between participating and staying
out of the market. However, in this model the consumer has the possibility to
participate in two different markets. The non-shoppers use a strategy µ such
that the expected payoffs in both markets are equal ex-ante.
In the equilibrium in which E[pH ] − E[pL] = VH − VL holds, it follows
that rH − rL = VH − VL (by Lemma 2.1 and the equilibrium equations for the
reservation prices). The reservation prices are much easier to analyze than the
expected prices. It can be seen that rL increases in µ whereas rH decreases in
µ.
µ is decreasing in its first argument. This means, that in the equilibrium
of Proposition 2.2, the larger the relative advantage of the high-quality firm,
the larger the fraction of non-shoppers, which visits the high-quality firm. To
keep rH − rL and therefore E[pH ]−E[pL] on level VH − VL, µ has to increase.
Intuitively, the high-quality firm needs an incentive to set higher prices. Hence,
in equilibrium a larger fraction of non-shoppers visits the high-quality firm first.
We can verify, that if the high-quality firm has a relative advantage, VH − cH −
(VL − cL) > 0, the right-hand side of the equation is positive, implying that
1
ΦH(λ,µ) >
1
ΦL(λ,µ) ⇔ ΦH < ΦL ⇔ µ < 12 . This means that the larger fraction
of non-shoppers visits the high-quality firm first. On the other hand if the low-
quality firm has a relative advantage, meaning VH − cH − (VL − cL) < 0, then
µ > 0.5. Thus, the larger fraction of non-shoppers visits to the low-quality firm
first.
The search costs have exactly the opposite impact on µ as the relative advan-
tage. Intuitively, in the equilibrium an increase in the search costs is equivalent
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to an increase of profits per non-shopper. Hence with larger search costs, a
smaller fraction of non-shoppers is needed to offset the incentive of the firm
with the relative advantage to lower its prices. Therefore, increasing search
costs drive µ towards 12 . (This can easily be seen by the reservation prices,
which both depend positively on s, whereas the firm reservation price increases
stronger for the firm with the relative advantage.) Positive search costs are
a necessary condition for the mixed-strategy equilibrium to exist. Otherwise
[VH − VL − (cH − cL)]/s can never be in the bounded interval given in (1.) of
Proposition 2.2.
An increase in λ means there are fewer non-shoppers present, and therefore
a larger fraction of the non-shoppers is needed to offset the incentive of the
firm with the relative advantage to lower its price (both reservation prices are
decreasing in λ, however, it decreases faster for the firm with the relative ad-
vantage). Hence, µ approaches the closest corner solution as λ increases (which
is one if the low-quality firm has a relative advantage and zero otherwise).
Consequently, since µ must have an interior solution such that both firms
have positive expected profits, the equilibrium in Proposition 2.2 fails for large
fractions of shoppers, λ, small search costs, s, and large relative advantages.
Relative Advantages, Search Costs and the Mixed-Strategy Equilib-
rium
Now we define s as the lower bound of the open interval of search costs, for
which a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2.3. The function s is given by
s(VH−VL−cH+cL, λ) =

VH−VL−cH+cL
1
ΦH (λ,0)
−1 if VH − VL − cH + cL > 0
0 if VH − VL − cH + cL = 0
VH−VL−cH+cL
1− 1ΦL(λ,1)
if VH − VL − cH + cL < 0
(2.15)
and increasing in the relative advantage.
The lower bound of the open interval of search costs for which a mixed-
strategy equilibrium exists is an increasing function of the relative advantage.
Intuitively, if one firm’s relative advantage increases, then the fraction of non-
shoppers attracted by this firm must increase such that E[pH ]−E[pL] = VH−VL
is fulfilled. On the one hand, µ approaches the corner solution if the relative
advantage increases, on the other hand the rents which can be extracted from
any non-shopper increases in the search costs s. Hence, larger search costs
are necessary if the relative advantage increases to prevent µ from becoming a
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corner solution, which would cause the equilibrium to collapse,
Furthermore, it can easily be verified, that we can find search costs large
enough for any relative advantage such that both firms have positive expected
profits.
Figure 2.1: The lower bound of the open interval of search costs for which a
mixed-strategy equilibrium exists s(VH − VL − cH + cL, λ).
In Figure 2.1 we depicted a coordinate system for all possible combinations
of relative advantages and search costs. On the x-axis we find VH − cH − (VL−
cL) and the lower bound for which a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists is on
the y-axis. Hence, on the right-hand side to the origin, the high-quality firm
has a relative advantage, whereas on the left-hand side of the origin, the low-
quality firm has a relative advantage. Farther from the origin means, that the
relative advantage increases. All combinations strictly above the function s are
combinations of relative advantages and search costs for which a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists. For all the combinations below the function, the firm with
the relative advantage charges prices so low, such that the competitor would
have negative expected profits and hence the mixed-strategy equilibrium breaks
down.
The combinations on the x-axis represent full-information (s = 0). For all
this coordinates the equilibrium fails to exist. However, if s is large enough the
equilibrium exists.
Furthermore, for all combinations on the y-axis no firm has a relative ad-
vantages. The mixed-strategy equilibrium exists for any s > 0. These equi-
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libria are exactly those analyzed in the typically consumer search models with
homogenous goods and symmetric firms. However, the graph displays that the
mixed-strategy equilibrium persists even if the firms are asymmetric in the sense
of relative advantages.
Corollary 2.2. If any firm has a relative advantage, then the firm with the rel-
ative advantage has larger expected profits in the equilibrium described in Propo-
sition 2.2.
2.4.7 Overlapping Price Distributions
Proposition 2.4. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the supports of the pricing
distributions overlap if s is large or VH − VL is sufficiently small. For homoge-
nous goods the supports always overlap.
This Proposition states that the pricing distributions in the mixed-strategy
equilibrium overlap if the qualities of the goods are sufficiently similar and if
search costs are sufficiently large. High search costs lead the firms to charge
high prices (large upper bounds), however if the products difference is not too
large, the expected prices do not differ much as we know from condition (2.7).
This means that under these circumstances there is a positive probability that
the low-quality product is sold for a higher price than the high-quality product.
Note, that if the goods are homogenous, VH = VL, the supports of the
price distribution always overlap in the mixed-strategy equilibrium.4 This is
the typical result we know for example from Stahl (1989).
2.4.8 Other Equilibria
First we note, that the equilibrium strategies in the complete information case
do not necessarily form an equilibrium under incomplete information.
Under complete information there can exist an equilibrium in which both
firms have zero profits. That is, both firms charge prices equal to their marginal
costs and at least one of them sells a positive amount. The next proposition
states that this equilibrium (without a relative advantage) does not persist under
incomplete information for every λ and every s > 0.
Proposition 2.5. In any equilibrium, at least one firm has positive expected
profits.
The reason is, that a firm which attracts non-shoppers has an incentive to
increase the price, since this fraction of consumers do not observe the deviation
4However, the mixed-strategy equilibrium might not exist in the case if cH − cL is too
large.
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and cannot costlessly switch to the other firm. Hence, the deviating firm has
strictly positive profits.
However, also the other equilibria may fail to exist. A complete information
equilibrium vanishes if additional profits from selling to non-shoppers can com-
pensate for the loss of the shoppers. To be more precise, the firm which attracts
non-shoppers increases the price by s. This makes the non-shoppers indifferent
between continuing search and buying immediately. The additional profits of
the deviating firm i are (1 − λ)s, whereas it looses λ(cj 6=i + Vi − Vj 6=i − ci).
Therefore,we have the next result.
Proposition 2.6. If firm i has a relative advantage and
1− λ
λ
<
Vi − Vj 6=i − ci + cj 6=i
s
(2.16)
holds, the pure-strategy (complete-information) equilibrium is an equilibrium.
Hence, large search costs, a small fraction of informed consumers, λ, and a
small relative advantage, causes the equilibrium to collapse.5
This raises the question, which kind of equilibria exists if the complete in-
formation equilibria does not exist.
The following proposition states that the only equilibria which might exist
are those, in which both firms have positive expected profits.
Proposition 2.7. If none of the complete information equilibria exist, there
does not exist an equilibrium in which exactly one firm has positive expected
profits.
Hence, the only alternative equilibria which can exist if the complete infor-
mation equilibrium fails are those each shop has positive expected profits and
hence the consumers have ex-ante the same expected utility at each shop (by
Lemma 2.3). Moreover, if the search costs are low and the fraction of shoppers
are large, the complete information equilibrium can persist.
2.5 Conclusion
We have set up a model in which two firms compete in prices for consumers.
One of the firms offers a low-quality product and the other one offers a high-
quality product. The quality offered by the firms is commonly known and the
firms can be distinguished by their quality.
In the situation in which all consumers are perfectly informed about the
prices charged, we have established pure-strategy equilibria in which at least
5A proof with symmetric firms is presented in Nermuth (1982), pp. 85. With asymmetric
firms, the idea is similar.
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one firm has zero profits. Only the firm with the relative advantage is able to
have positive profits.
However, in the interesting case, a fraction of the consumers (the non-
shoppers) is involved in costly search. This means that this fraction does not
know the realization of prices ex-ante. We have established the existence of a
mixed-strategy equilibrium in which firms set prices according to a distribution.
Moreover, each shop sells to a fraction of non-shoppers. Hence, both firms have
positive profits. Such an equilibrium can exist even if relative advantages are
large.
A necessary condition for the equilibrium to exist, is that search costs are
strictly positive. Furthermore, the larger the search costs the larger is the set
of disadvantaged firms which can survive.
Additionally, in the mixed-strategy equilibrium the realization of the price
of the low-quality product can be larger than the realization of the price of the
high-quality product. The reason for this is that non-shoppers will not visit the
other firm if the expected utility gain from continued search is small. That is,
high search costs and a low quality difference.
Finally, we have shown that the equilibrium found under complete informa-
tion also exists under incomplete information if the fraction of shoppers as well
as the product difference is large and the search costs are small. However, if
it does not exist, the only class of equilibria which can exist, are equilibria in
which both firms have positive profits and a share of the non-shoppers.
2.A Appendix: Proofs
2.A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Consider there is a relative advantage for the high-quality firm, that
is VH − cH − (VL − cL) > 0, the equilibrium strategies pL = cL and pH =
cL + VH − VL and all consumers visit the high-quality firm. The low-quality
firm has no incentive to deviate to higher prices, since it would not attract
consumers. If the high-quality firm would deviate to higher prices, it would lose
all consumers, since VL − cL > VH − pH for pH > cL + VH − VL. Obviously,
the high-quality firm has no incentive to lower its price, since it cannot attract
additional consumers.
The same arguments hold if VH − cH − (VL − cL) < 0.
Consider now VH − cH = VL − cL and the equilibrium strategies pL = cL
and pH = cH . Charging larger prices lead to the loss of all consumers one firm
attracts. Thus, there is no incentive to deviate.
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2.A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Consider now, that p¯L < p¯H − (VH − VL). However, then prices in the
interval (p¯L + VH − VL, p¯H) are not optimal for the high-quality firm, since
increasing them does not lead to a loss of consumers. Hence, FH(·) is constant
on the interval (p¯L + VH − VL, pH). However, increasing p¯L yields more profits
per sold unit without losing expected consumers. Hence p¯L < p¯H − (VH − VL)
cannot be optimal for the low-quality firm.
Showing that p¯L > p¯H − (VH − VL) cannot hold is analogous.
However, if the high-quality firm charges the upper-bound p¯H , the proba-
bility of attracting shoppers is 1− FL(p¯L) = 0. Hence, as long as p¯H < rH the
firm can increase its upper bound without losing consumers.
2.A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. From Lemma 2.1 we know that p¯H = p¯L + VH − VL. We want to show
now that p¯H > rH cannot hold. If this would be the case, then the high-quality
firm does not attract any consumers by charging the upper bound. The reason
for this is that it attracts no shoppers, 1 − FL(p¯L) = 0. However, also the
non-shoppers would leave and return with probability 1 − FL(p¯L) = 0. Thus,
charging p¯H > rH yields zero profits.
It is analogous to show that p¯L > rL cannot hold.
2.A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. Suppose that all non-shoppers visit the high-quality firm first. Then the
low-quality firm must attract shoppers with positive probability to have positive
expected profits. By Lemma 2.1, p¯L = p¯H − (VH − VL) must hold. However,
then the low-quality firm attracts no shoppers by charging the upper bound,
since 1 − FL(p¯L) = 0. Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium in which one firm
attracts all non-shoppers and both firms have positive profits.
The case in which the low-quality firm attracts all non-shoppers is analogous.
2.A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. First, we want to show the second point of the proposition. Therefore,
we suppose that µ ∈ (0, 1).
In any equilibrium, FL(pL) and FH(pH) must satisfy
ΠL(p, FH(·)) = ΠL(p, FH(p¯L + VH − VL))
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for all prices p of the low quality firm which are optimal. Moreover, we must
have
ΠH(p, FL(·)) = ΠH(pH , FL(p¯H − (VH − VL)))
for all optimal prices p of the high quality firm.
By Lemma 2.1 p¯i = ri for i = H,L and p¯H = p¯L + (VH − VL). Since the
distributions are assumed to have no mass points, a firm charging price p¯i only
sells to the non-shoppers. If the firm uses a mixed pricing strategy, any price
charged in equilibrium must yield the same profits. Thus, any price charged by
firm L in equilibrium fulfills
(p− cL) · [λ(1− FH(p+ VH − VL)) + µ(1− λ)] = (p¯L − cL)µ(1− λ) (2A.1)
and any price charged by firm H fulfills
(p−cH)·[λ(1− FL(p− (VH − VL))) + (1− µ)(1− λ)] = (p¯H−cH)(1−µ)(1−λ).
(2A.2)
The pricing strategies are given by the following expressions:
FL(p− (VH − VL)) = 1−
(
p¯H − p
p− cH
(1− µ)(1− λ)
λ
)
,
FH(p+ VH − VL) = 1−
(
p¯L − p
p− cL
µ(1− λ)
λ
)
.
Thus, the pricing strategies are given by
FL(p) = 1−
(
p¯H − p+ VH − VL
p+ VH − VL − cH
(1− µ)(1− λ)
λ
)
, (2A.3)
FH(p) = 1−
(
p¯L − p+ VH − VL
p− (VH − VL)− cL
µ(1− λ)
λ
)
. (2A.4)
The lower bounds of the distributions fulfill Fi(p) = 0. It is then easy to derive
the lower bound. They are given by
p
L
=
(1− µ) 1−λλ p¯H + cH
1 + (1− µ) 1−λλ
− (VH − VL). (2A.5)
p
H
= (p¯L − cL)
1−λ
λ µ
1 + 1−λλ µ
+ VH − VL + cL. (2A.6)
Note, that the expressions for the lower bounds in (2A.5) and (2A.6) still depend
on the upper bounds of the distributions. Thus, we have to find an expressions
for rH and rL. For this purpose, we use the conditions (2.2) and (2.3) and
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express the reservation prices, which are
rL = E[pH ]− (VH − VL) + s and
rH = E[pL] + (VH − VL) + s.
Obviously, we first have to calculate the expectations of the prices, E[pi] for
i = H,L. To do this, we change the variable and write E[pL] =
∫ 1
0 pLdx and
E[pH ] =
∫ 1
0 pHdx. From the pricing strategies (2A.3) and (2A.4) we can express
pL and pH and thus the expected prices are given by
E[pH ] =
∫ 1
0
(
(p¯L − cL)
1−λ
λ µ
(1− x) + 1−λλ µ
+ cL + VH − VL
)
dx
=p¯L
∫ 1
0
1−λ
λ µ
(1− x) + 1−λλ µ
dx
+ cL
∫ 1
0
1− x
(1− x) + 1−λλ µ
dx+ VH − VL
=p¯L [1− ΦL(λ, µ)] + cLΦL(λ, µ) + VH − VL
E[pL] =
(
(p¯H − cH)
1−λ
λ µ
(1− x) + 1−λλ µ
+ cH − (VH − VL)
)
dx
=p¯H
∫ 1
0
(1− µ) 1−λλ
(1− x) + (1− µ) 1−λλ
dx
+ cH
∫ 1
0
1− x
(1− x) + (1− µ) 1−λλ
dx− (VH − VL)
=p¯H [1− ΦH(λ, µ)] + cHΦH(λ, µ)− (VH − VL)
Since p¯i = ri we obtain
rL = rL [1− ΦL(λ, µ)] + cLΦL(λ, µ) + s⇔
rL = cL +
s
ΦL(λ, µ)
≥ cL + s (2A.7)
with ΦL defined in (2.10) and
rH = rH [1− ΦH(λ, µ)] + cHΦH(λ, µ) + s⇔
rH = cH +
s
ΦH(λ, µ)
≥ cH + s (2A.8)
with ΦH defined in (2.11).
Finally, we insert the expression for the reservation prices into the lower
bounds and into the pricing distributions to obtain expression which only depend
on exogenous parameters.
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Next, we want to verify that point one of the proposition is true. To do this
we insert the upper bounds of the distribution into inequality (2.8) and (2.9)
to ensure that both firms make positive profits. After some simple algebraic
operations we obtain
s · µ(1− λ) >0 and
s · (1− µ)(1− λ) >0.
These two inequalities hold if and only if µ has an interior solution, since λ ∈
(0, 1) and s > 0. The fraction µ is endogenously determined by E[pH ]−E[pL] =
VH − VL. The difference of the expected prices is
E[pH ]− E[pL] =p¯L [1− ΦL(λ, µ)] + cLΦL(λ, µ) + VH − VL
− p¯H [1− ΦH(λ, µ)]− cHΦH(λ, µ) + VH − VL
=
(
cL +
s
ΦL(λ, µ)
)
[1− ΦL(λ, µ)] + cLΦL(λ, µ)
−
(
cH +
s
ΦH(λ, µ)
)
[1− ΦH(λ, µ)]− cHΦH(λ, µ)
+ 2(VH − VL)
=cL +
s
ΦL(λ, µ)
[1− ΦL(λ, µ)]
− cH − sΦH(λ, µ) [1− ΦH(λ, µ)] + 2(VH − VL)
=cL +
s
ΦL(λ, µ)
− cH − sΦH(λ, µ) + 2(VH − VL).
And hence the solution for µ is implicitly given by
1
ΦH(λ, µ)
− 1ΦL(λ, µ) =
VH − VL − (cH − cL)
s
(2A.9)
Since ΦH(λ, µ) is increasing and ΦL(λ, µ) decreases in µ, the left hand side is
strictly decreasing in µ for µ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, µ is uniquely defined by (2A.9)
as long as it is in the interval (0, 1) and depends on VH −VL− (cH − cL), λ and
s. Hence, µ > 0 if
1
ΦH(λ, 0)
− 1ΦL(λ, 0) =
1
ΦH(λ, 0)
− 1 = 1− Φ(λ, 0)Φ(λ, 0) >
VH − VL − (cH − cL)
s
and µ < 1 if
1
ΦH(λ, 0)
− 1ΦL(λ, 0) = 1−
1
ΦL(λ, 1)
= −1− ΦL(λ, 1)ΦL(λ, 1) <
VH − VL − (cH − cL)
s
(2A.10)
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holds. Therefore, we can conclude that point one of the proposition is true.
2.A.6 Proof of Corollary 2.1
Proof. If the expected profits are equal, the following holds:(
cH +
s
ΦH(λ, µ)
− cH
)
µ(1− λ) =
(
cL +
s
ΦL(λ, µ)
− cL
)
µ(1− λ)
ΦL(λ, µ) = ΦH(λ, µ)
This holds only if µ = 0.5. This is exactly the case when no firm has a relative
advantage.
2.A.7 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. The equilibrium of Proposition 2.2 exists if µ ∈ (0, 1).
Consider the high-quality firm has a relative advantage, that is VH − cH −
(VL − cL) > 0. Then µ ∈ (0, 0.5) for an interior solution. Since µ is increasing
in s, the largest value of s for which the mixed strategy equilibrium does not
exist can be calculated from condition (2.12) and is given by
s¯ = VH − cH − (VL − cL)1
ΦH(λ,0) − 1ΦL(λ,0)
.
It is easy to see that it is an increasing function of VH − cH − (VL − cL).
If VH − cH − (VL − cL) < 0, then µ ∈ (0.5, 1) for the interior solutions and
µ is decreasing in s. Hence, the largest value of s for which the mixed strategy
equilibrium does not exist can be calculated from condition (2.12) and is defined
by
s¯ = VH − cH − (VL − cL)1
ΦH(λ,1) − 1ΦL(λ,1)
.
It is a decreasing function of VH − cH − (VL − cL).
Hence the function
s¯(VH − cH − (VL − cL)) =

VH−cH−(VL−cL)
1
ΦH (λ,0)
−1 if VH − cH − (VL − cL) > 0
0 if VH − cH − (VL − cL) = 0
VH−cH−(VL−cL)
1− 1ΦL(λ,1)
if VH − cH − (VL − cL) < 0
is increasing in the relative advantage, |VH − cH − (VL − cL)|, with a constant
slope. Note, that the mixed strategy equilibrium does not exist for s < s¯(VH −
cH − (VL − cL))
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2.A.8 Proof of Corollary 2.2
Proof. Consider the case in which VH − cH − (VL− cL) > 0. Then the expected
profits for any price charged in the equilibrium are given by (cH + sΦH(λ,µ) −
cH)µ(1−λ) and (cL+ sΦL(λ,µ) −cL)µ(1−λ) for the high-quality and low-quality
firm, respectively. Thus, we have(
cH +
s
ΦH(λ, µ)
− cH
)
µ(1− λ) >
(
cL +
s
ΦL(λ, µ)
− cL
)
µ(1− λ)
ΦL(λ, µ) > ΦH(λ, µ),
This inequality holds if µ < 0.5, which is is the case if the high-quality firm has
a relative advantage.
The case in which the low quality firm has the relative advantage, VH−cH−
(VL − cL) < 0, is analogous.
2.A.9 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. The price distributions are overlapping if the largest price of the low-
quality firm is larger than the lowest price of the high-quality firm.
cL +
s
ΦL(λ, µ)
>
s
ΦL(λ, µ)
·
1−λ
λ µ
1 + 1−λλ µ
+ VH − VL + cL ⇔
s
VH − VL >
(
1 + 1− λ
λ
µ
)
ΦL(λ, µ). (2A.11)
However, the right-hand side still depends on VH , VL and µ through µ. Fix
now, VH and VL such that the low-quality good has a relative advantage, VH −
VL − cH + cL < 0. Then µ ∈ (0.5, 1) and is decreasing in s. This means that,
lim
s→∞
(
1 + 1− λ
λ
µ
)
ΦL(λ, µ)→
(
1 + 1− λ2λ
)∫ 1
0
1− x
1− x+ 1−λ2λ
<∞
Hence, we can find an s large enough, such that the inequality (2A.11) holds,
since lims→∞ sVH−VL → ∞. This fraction tends faster to infinity if VH − VL
is small and hence the price distributions overlap for sufficiently large s and
sufficiently low VH − VL. The case in which the high-quality firm has a relative
advantage can be derived analogously.
2.A.10 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. Suppose both firms have zero expected profits. This means, that the
firms either charge prices lower than their marginal costs or so large that the
buyers do not buy.
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There is no equilibrium in which both firms charge prices strictly lower
than their marginal costs, since at least one firm attracts consumers and has
an incentive to increase the price to avoid losses. Thus, a firm which attracts
consumers must charge the marginal costs. However, also the non-shoppers buy
at such a price. Thus, the firm which attracts non-shoppers has an incentive to
raise the price, since the non-shoppers cannot costlessly switch the firm.
If both firms charge prices pˆi for i = 1, 2 such that no consumer buys, it
is obvious that both firms have an incentive to decrease the price to attract
consumers, since there exists an  > 0 such that Vi − ci − (pˆ− ) > 0.
If one firm charges a price not larger than the marginal costs whereas the
other charges prices such that no consumers buy, the first firm attracts all the
consumers. However, then it can deviate to a price above marginal costs without
loosing any consumers.
2.A.11 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. In the text.
2.A.12 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Proof. Assume throughout the proof, that the high-quality firm has a relative
advantage, VH − cH > VL − cL. The case in which the low-quality firm has a
relative advantage is analogous.
In the equilibrium, the firm with the relative advantage is the firm which has
positive expected profits. Assume that the high-quality firm has zero profits,
whereas the low-quality firm has positive profits. The low-quality firm uses a
strategy FL(p) with p ∈ [pL, p¯L]. However, then the high-quality firm can set
the price equal to p
L
+VH−VL. Since pL yields strictly positive expected profits,
p
L
> cL, and VH − VL + cL > cH , also VH − VL + pL > cH holds. Thus, the
high-quality firm can attract all shoppers by undercutting p
L
− (VH −VL) > cH
and thus can have strictly positive profits.
Now we show, that the firm with the relative advantage cannot be the firm
with the only firm which has positive expected profits. Assume that the high-
quality firm has positive profits, whereas the low-quality firm has zero profits.
Then it must be the case that p
L
+ VH − VL ≥ p¯H or pL = cL. Assume
p
L
+ VH − VL > p¯H , then p¯H can not be optimal, since the high-quality firm
can increase the upper bound without loosing consumers. Moreover, if p
L
+
VH−VL = p¯H holds in equilibrium, then pH < p¯H can not be optimal, since the
high-quality firm can increase p
H
without loosing consumers. Furthermore, also
a pure strategy cannot be optimal for firm H. If firm L uses a mixed strategy,
i.e. p
L
< p¯L. Then the low quality firm attracts shoppers at pL, but not at
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any other price it charges. Thus, any price larger than p cannot be optimal. If
both firms use pure-strategies then the only prices which form an equilibrium
are pL = cL and pH = cL+VH −VL if all consumers visit the high quality firm.
However, this is the complete information which is excluded by hypothesis.
Chapter 3
On the Profitability of
Gatekeepers: The Role of
Asymmetric Firms
3.1 Introduction
Gatekeepers in the internet like price comparison websites have gained much
popularity in the last decade. Typically, sellers can choose to pay a fee to the
gatekeepers to list their prices for certain products on these websites. Consumers
usually have free access to the price lists. Now, a huge variety of products are
listed on these websites. Moreover, there exists a large number of specialized
price comparison sites which concentrate on only one category of products such
as books or CDs. However, it is not clear why we find gatekeepers in some
markets, but not in others. This question has not been answered in the existing
literature. Moreover, all existing models assume markets for homogenous goods
with firms having identical costs e.g. Baye and Morgan (2001). This paper
introduces asymmetric firms into the framework of Baye and Morgan (2001)
and examines the impact of asymmetry on the gatekeeper’s expected profits.
Moreover, it takes into account that gatekeepers do not only offer lists of prices
for certain particular products, they also offer lists of products in certain cat-
egories.1 That is, consumers also have to decide which product in the list has
the best utility and price. This gives rise to consider vertically differentiated
goods instead of homogenous goods. Moreover, a large number of different firms
advertise their prices on gatekeepers’ websites. On one hand, one finds small
1For instance, a search for an USB-stick on a gatekeeper’s site will provide the consumer
with a list of USB-sticks with different capacities from different manufacturers.
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retailers having only one shop, on the other hand there are also retailer chains.
However, it is difficult to imagine that these different firms have the same cost
structure. Consequently, this gives rise to consider differences in costs. This
paper examines which markets offer the highest incentive for the gatekeeper to
enter. For this purpose we adopt a simplified version of the Baye and Mor-
gan model (2001), however, we introduce firms with non-identical products and
non-identical costs, such that they have a different profitability.
We show that the firm which has an advantage over the competitor (in
the sense of profitability) advertises more aggressively and captures the larger
expected profits. Interestingly, the gatekeeper benefits from this asymmetry.
That is, it prefers markets with large asymmetries in the sense of advantages
over those with small ones. The rationale for this finding is that the gatekeeper
increases the advertising fee when the advantage rises. This lets the advertising
propensities drift apart and thus lowers price competition. This results into
larger returns per sale of the firms, which can be extracted by the gatekeeper.
Moreover, if the advantage is very large, the gatekeeper sets an advertising
fee such that it is only profitable for the firm with the larger profitability to
remain in the market. Furthermore, a more efficient allocation of goods can be
achieved through the existence of the gatekeeper, in particular the existence of
the gatekeeper can enhance the social welfare if the advantage is large and the fix
costs of the gatekeeper are sufficiently small.2 The entrance of a gatekeeper in
markets in which firm’s profitabilities are similar is detrimental to social welfare.
Thus a social planner should prohibit entrance.
We consider two local markets. In each of the local markets there is one
firm. We allow the firms to offer vertically differentiated goods and to have
different marginal costs. There is a unit mass of consumers with unit demand
and homogenous preferences. In each of the local markets there is one half of
the consumers. Moreover, in each of the markets there is the same fraction
non-users who can only buy at their local market. The other fraction of these
consumers first observe the prices and the quality listed at a gatekeeper’s website
(which is a clearinghouse in the sense of Varian (1980)). This gatekeeper creates
a virtual market place which allows the firms to offer their goods to a fraction
of consumers in the other market. That is, without its existence, all consumers
can only buy at their local markets. The gatekeeper sets an advertising fee
for both firms at which the firms can advertise their prices at the gatekeeper’s
clearinghouse. The firms decide simultaneously if they want to advertise their
price at the gatekeeper’s website and which price to set.
2In this model half of the non-loyal consumers receive the socially inefficient good if there
is no gatekeeper. However, if there is a gatekeeper and the advantage is large enough, this
fraction of consumers purchase the socially efficient good. The gatekeeper enhances social
welfare if this gain of a more efficient allocation exceeds the fix costs of the gatekeeper.
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The most related article is that of Baye and Morgan (2001) in which a gate-
keeper faces a market consisting of identical firms which compete in a homoge-
nous goods market. The gatekeeper sets an advertising fee and then the firms
decide whether to advertise their prices or to offer it only in a local market with
a small number of consumers. They show that several equilibria might arise. In
the most interesting equilibria the firms use mixed pricing strategies. However,
the results rely strongly on the assumption of identical firms and homogenous
products.
Arnold, Li, Saliba and Zhang (2008) have adopted the Baye and Morgan
framework and introduced asymmetric market sizes, in the sense that each firm
has a different number of loyal (local) consumers. They found that the firm with
the smaller loyal consumer segment advertises more aggressively and prices less
competitively than than the firm with the larger loyal market. Moreover, they
found a subgame in which the firm with the fewer loyal customers advertises
with probability one. Other models as Narasimhan (1988) and Kocas and Kiyak
(2006) study this asymmetry without modelling the gatekeeper and hence do
not endogenize the advertising fee.
Schlag (2000) considers a model in which consumers do not know the prices
charged by the firms in the market. To become informed about the price charged
by a firm, consumers have to visit the firm, which is assumed to be costly. More-
over, the gatekeeper in the market knows all prices in the market and can sell
this information to consumers. Schlag (2000) finds that a monopolistic gate-
keeper (or colluding gatekeepers) induce maximal price dispersion3. Moreover,
buying the information at the gatekeeper is very attractive for consumers if the
number of competing firms is large. The reason is that firms either charge the
competitive price or the monopoly price when the number of firms approaches
infinity.
Baye and Morgan (2009) assume a gatekeeper model in which firms can
brand their product. More precisely, they can spend resources in the first stage
to increase the number of loyal customers who do not use the gatekeeper’s
website to compare prices. In particular, they show that the total fraction of
loyal consumers is independent of the gatekeeper’s advertising fee in the derived
symmetric equilibrium. Consequently, the optimal advertising fee in their model
is equivalent to the one in models in which branding is exogenous and hence the
total number of loyal consumers.
Furthermore, Robert and Stahl (1993) as well as Janssen and Non (2009)
study the relationship of costly search and informative price advertising in se-
quential search models. In Robert and Stahl (1993) a finite number of symmetric
3Price dispersion is measured by the normalized difference of the average price and the
minimum price in the market of the symmetric pricing distribution of the firms.
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firms compete in prices for a unit mass of consumers who are ex-ante uninformed.
Any firm chooses the fraction of consumers which become informed about the
posted price. The equilibrium converges to perfect competition if the advertis-
ing costs vanish. Moreover, advertising can decrease if the search costs become
small and hence prices can remain above the marginal costs. Janssen and Non
(2009) assume an additional stage in which firms first decide whether to sell the
good or not. When they decide to sell the good, they can inform the consumers
about the fact that they sell the good and about the price charged. Thus, the
consumers are willing to pay a larger price at an advertising firm instead of
searching for a non-advertising firm selling the good. Since advertising low-
ers the expected search costs, advertised prices are larger than non-advertised
prices.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2 we set up our
variant of the Baye and Morgan-model which is very similar to that of Arnold et
al (2008). In section 3 we present the expected profits of the firms and derive the
optimal behavior of them in any subgame. Section 4 presents the optimization
problem of the gatekeeper and we derive the optimal advertising fee. In section 5
we establish the subgame perfect equilibrium and do some comparative statics.
The final section concludes. All proofs can be found in Appendix B.
3.2 The Model
We assume two local markets. In each market there is one risk-neutral firm
i = H,L. Firm H sells a high quality good and firm L sells a low quality good.
We assume the firms to have different marginal costs, which we will denote
by cH and cL and assume that cL ≤ cH . Moreover, there is a unit mass of
risk-neutral consumers with homogenous preferences and unit demand. That
is, their reservation price for good H is given by VH and their reservation price
for good L is given by VL with VL ≤ VH and Vi > ci for i = H,L. Moreover,
we assume two types of consumers. In each local market there is a fraction of λ
with λ < 12 of non-users (or loyal consumers) who do not use the gatekeeper’s
website.4 They only buy at their local firm provided that it yields a positive
utility. Otherwise they leave the market without buying. Therefore, we will
refer to them as loyals. The other 12 − λ consumers in each market first observe
the prices quoted at the information gatekeeper’s website. That is, if there are
price quotations at the gatekeeper’s website, the non-loyal consumers buy the
advertised good which consumption yields the higher utility, provided that the
utility is nonnegative. If both firms are listed and the consumption of the good
4The asymmetric case in which one market has a larger fraction of non-users with sym-
metric firms is analyzed by Arnold et al. (2008).
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yields the same utility, the non-loyals buy at each store with probability one
half. If no firm is listed, the non-loyals buy at their local firms, provided that
the consumption yields a positive utility.5 The advertising fee, which is charged
to firms who want to quote their price at the gatekeeper’s site, is denoted by
Φ. The gatekeeper is assumed to set the same advertising fee for both firms.6
Furthermore, the gatekeeper has no variable costs and the average fixed costs
per consumer are given by CG. Moreover, the advertising probability of firm i
is denoted by αi for i = 1, 2. Moreover, the firms are assumed to condition their
price setting behavior on their advertising choice. Therefore, the cumulative
distribution function of the advertised pricing strategy of the firms is given by
Fi(p) = Prob(pi ≤ p). The support’s lower bound is denoted by pi and the
upper bound by p¯i for i = 1, 2.7
The sequence of action is as follows. First, the gatekeeper sets the advertising
fee. Then the firms observe the advertising fee and make simultaneously their
advertising and pricing decisions. Finally, the consumers make their purchasing
decisions.
Our strategy is to solve this problem by backward induction. Hence, we first
assume that the advertising fee is fixed and solve the problem of the firms.
3.3 Subgames
In this section we first present the firm’s expected profits from non-advertising
and define a firm’s advantage. Moreover, we define the expected profits from
advertising and derive conditions under which only one firm advertises in equi-
librium. Finally, we will derive the optimal behavior of the firms if it is optimal
for both firms to advertise.
3.3.1 Expected Profits From Non-Advertising
The first lemma states that a firm which does not advertise, charges its valuation
Vi.
5This assumption reproduces the consumer behavior of Baye and Morgan (2001). More
precisely, one could assume, analogous to Baye and Morgan (2001), that all consumers have
small costs s > 0 to visit the local shop. Then, the assumed consumer behavior arises in the
equilibrium. The firms charge price Vi− s for i = H,L when they do not advertise. This only
extents the analysis without leading to further insights.
6This assumption is made analogous to the relevant literature of Baye and Morgan (2001)
and Arnold et al. (2008). Furthermore, it seems plausible in our setting that the gateekeper
has an incentive to discriminate the firms. However, you find an enormous amount of firms
which advertise their products on price comparison website. Thus, it is implausible that
gatekeepers charge different prices to all those firms. Therefore, we refrain from modelling
price discrimination.
7We do not introduce a distribution function for the firms when they do not advertise,
since it will be degenerated in the equilibrium.
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Lemma 3.1. In any equilibrium, firm i charges the monopoly price Vi if it does
not advertise.
The fraction of attracted consumers does not depend on the price of a non-
advertising firm. Hence, charging lower prices than Vi cannot belong to an
optimal strategy of firm i. Therefore, the expected profits, when firm i does not
advertise, are given by
ΠNi = (Vi − ci)
[
λ+ (1− αj)
(
1
2 − λ
)]
(3.1)
for i 6= j and i = H,L. Firm i has Vi − ci profits per sale and sells to its loyal
consumers, λ. Additionally, it sells to the non-loyal shoppers in the market if
the competitor, firm j, does not advertise.
As a benchmark, consider there is no gatekeeper. Hence, none of the firms
has the possibility to attract all non-loyal customers and their expected profits
reduce to
ΠNi =
Vi − ci
2 .
These profits do not have to be identical for i = H,L. Firm i has larger expected
profits if Vi−ci ≥ Vj−cj . Therefore, we have the following reasonable definition.
Definition 3.1. Firm i has an advantage if Vj − cj < Vi − ci for i 6= j and the
advantage is given by Vi − ci − (Vj − cj).
Moreover, we reduce our analysis to the case in which the high quality firm
has a advantage, since the other case is the mirror image and does not yield
additional insights.
Assumption 3.1. The high quality firm has a advantage, that is VL − cL <
VH − cH holds.
Moreover, we will consider changes in the advantage. For this purpose we
will keep VL− cL fixed and only consider changes in the profitability of the high
quality firm.
Note, that none of the firms advertise if Φ fulfills (VH − cH)(1 − λ) − Φ <
1
2 (VH − cH), that is αi = 0 for i = H,L. This inequality can be rewritten to
Φ > (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
. Moreover, we can find a set of parameters for which
only one firm advertises.
3.3.2 One Advertising Firm
Consider firm H advertises. The maximum additional profits firm L can achieve
from advertising are given by (VL−cL)(1−2λ). That is, it attracts all non-loyal
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consumers instead of none. Thus, the low quality firm has no strict incentive
to advertise as long as Φ ≥ (VL − cL)(1− 2λ). Clearly, Φ ≤ (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
must hold, too. Therefore, we have
Proposition 3.1. If (VL− cL)(1−2λ) ≤ Φ ≤ (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
, then the high
quality firm advertises price VH with certainty and the low quality firm does not
advertise and sets its price equal to VL.
For this equilibrium to be achievable, the above interval for Φ must be
nonempty. Therefore, we necessarily must have VH−cH ≥ 2(VL−cL). Thus, the
high quality firm must have a sufficiently large advantage. In these subgames
the high quality firm advertises with certainty and can quote the monopoly
price VH , since the low quality firm abstains from advertising with certainty.
Moreover, the low quality firm charges the monopoly price VL by Lemma 3.1.
The high quality firm has larger profits than the low quality firm. That is, the
difference is given by (VH−cH)(1−λ)−Φ−(VL−cL)λ, which can be rearranged
to [VH − cH − (VL − cL)]λ+ (VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− Φ ≥ 0. It can be easily seen
that the difference is strictly increasing in the advantage.
3.3.3 Two Advertising Firms
In this subsection, we want to derive the optimal behavior when both firms
advertise. That is, we assume throughout the analysis of this subsection that
the gatekeeper’s advertising fee is small enough to fulfill Φ < min{(VL−cL)(1−
2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)}. First we derive some preliminary results which de-
scribes the firm’s optimal behavior in any equilibrium.
The next result states that both firms advertise with positive probability.
Lemma 3.2. If Φ < min{(VL − cL)(1 − 2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} holds, both
firms advertise with positive probability in any equilibrium. That is αi > 0 for
i = H,L.
The net gain from advertising is positive at least for the high quality firm.
Hence, at least the high quality firm advertises. However, if the high quality
firm would be the only firm which advertises it would set the monopoly price. In
this case also the low quality firm has an incentive to advertise a price slightly
lower VL to attract all non-loyal consumers, since Φ < (VL− cL)(1− 2λ). Thus,
there cannot be an equilibrium in which one firm does not advertise.
Furthermore, there is at least one firm which mixes between advertising and
not advertising its price.
Lemma 3.3. If Φ < min{(VL− cL)(1− 2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} holds, at most
one firm advertises with probability one in any equilibrium. That is αi < 1 for
at least one i, i = 1, 2.
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If both firms advertise with certainty, they find themselves in a Bertrand-
competition for the non-loyal consumers. Thus, the only possible candidate for
an equilibrium is that at least one firms charges a price equal to its marginal
costs. However, advertising leads to negative profits for this firm for any Φ > 0.
Therefore, it has an incentive to deviate from advertising, since abstaining from
advertising and selling only to the loyal customers yields strictly positive profits.
Now, we want to analyze the advertised pricing distribution which the firms
use when they advertise.
Lemma 3.4. If Φ < min{(VL−cL)(1−2λ), (VH−cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} holds, the firms
use mixed pricing strategies in any equilibrium. That is Fi(·) is not degenerated
for i = 1, 2.
A high deterministic pricing strategy of one firm gives the competing firm an
incentive to advertise and undercut this price. A low deterministic price gives
the competing firm an incentive to abstain completely from advertising (this
contradicts Lemma 3.2). Thus, it becomes optimal for the firm to increase the
price. Therefore, there can only be an equilibrium in mixed pricing strategies.
In any equilibrium the difference of the lower bounds is equal to the difference
of the consumers’ valuations for the goods, VH − VL.
Lemma 3.5. If Φ < min{(VL−cL)(1−2λ), (VH−cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} holds, the lower
bounds are set such that p
H
− p
L
= VH − VL holds in any equilibrium .
If this condition would not be fulfilled, then one firm could increase the
lower bound of its advertised pricing strategy without risking to losing con-
sumers. Hence, it increases the expected profits per sale without diminishing
the expected sales. Although, this Lemma looks innocent, it plays a crucial role
when we derive the equilibria.
The next two lemmata state that advertised pricing distributions have no
mass points and are connected below the monopoly price.
Lemma 3.6. If Φ < min{(VL − cL)(1 − 2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} holds, the
advertised pricing distribution does not have a mass point on the interval [p
i
, Vi)
for i = 1, 2 in any equilibrium.
Consider firm H would have a mass point, pm, fulfilling p ≤ pm < VH . Then
we can find an  > 0, such that firm L does not charge prices in an interval above
pm, [pm−(VH−VL), pm−(VH−VL)+], since undercutting the mass point of firm
H increases the probability of attracting the non-loyal consumers sufficiently to
raise the expected profits by a discrete amount. However, then firm H could
shift its mass point to larger prices without loosing consumers. Therefore, there
cannot be mass points below the monopoly price in the equilibrium.
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Lemma 3.7. If Φ < min{(VL − cL)(1 − 2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} holds, the
advertised pricing distribution is connected on the interval [p
i
, Vi) for i = 1, 2
in any equilibrium.
The optimal response of firm L to a strategy of firm H which puts zero
probability weight on an interval (p1, p2) of prices is to put zero probability on
the interval (p1− (VH −VL), p2− (VH −VL)). Consequently, if firm H charges a
price p1 it has the same number of expected consumers as charging prices from
the interval (p1, p2) and can therefore not be optimal.
The next Lemma shows that at most one firm has an atom at its monopoly
price if it advertises.
Lemma 3.8. If Φ < min{(VL − cL)(1 − 2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} and firm i
advertises Vi with strict positive probability, firm j does not advertise Vj in any
equilibrium.
If one firm has an atom at its monopoly price, the other firm has an incentive
to undercut the atom slightly such that the profits per sale are decreased slightly,
but the expected number of consumers are increased by a discrete amount.
Moreover, it follows immediately from Lemma 3.6 and 3.8 that either both
firms advertised pricing strategies do not have mass points or firm j advertises
Vj with positive probability and only firm i’s pricing strategy has no mass point.
The supports of both firms’ pricing strategies have the same length, but that of
the low quality firm is shifted down by VH − VL.
Thus, the expected profits if firm L advertises a price p ≤ VL are given by
ΠAL = (p− cL) [λ+ (1− αHFH(p+ VH − VL))(1− 2λ)]− Φ. (3.2)
Firm L attracts its loyal consumers, L, with certainty and additionally attracts
the non-loyal consumers with probability 1 − αHFH(p + VH − VL). The term
αHFH(p + VH − VL) is the probability that firm H advertises a pˆH fulfilling
pˆ < p+VH −VL at which all non-loyal consumers prefer to buy the high quality
good, since VH − pˆH > VL − p. Therefore, 1− αHFH(p+ VH − VL) is the joint
probability of all states in which firm L attracts the non-loyals if it advertises
price p.
Analogously, the expected profits if firm H advertises a price p ≤ VH are
given by
ΠAH = (p− cH) [λ+ (1− αLFL(p− (VH − VL)))(1− 2λ)]− Φ. (3.3)
By Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 either both firms advertise with positive probability
strictly less than one or one firm advertises with certainty and the competitor
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advertises with positive probability strictly less than one. To figure out which
equilibrium of these two types occur, we define p˜i to be the lowest price firm i
is willing to advertise in equilibrium. That is, the maximum possible profits p˜i
can yield must be equal to the profits of non-advertising. Thus, p˜ is defined by
the following condition
(p˜i − ci)(1− λ)− Φ = (Vi − ci)
[
λ+ (1− αj)
(
1
2 − λ
)]
(3.4)
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2. If we express p˜i explicitly, we obtain
p˜i =
(Vi − ci)[λ+ (1− αj)
( 1
2 − λ
)
] + Φ
1− λ + ci. (3.5)
By Lemma 3.2 and 3.3 at least one firm is indifferent between advertising and
non-advertising. Moreover, by 3.6 one firm’s lower bound must be equal to
p˜. We can now verify that αL < 1 holds. If this would not be the case,
then p˜L > p˜H − (VH − VL) holds and pH = p˜H , since firm αH < 1 must
hold. However, firm H can increase the lower bound without loosing consumers
and thus firm H has smaller profits if it abstains from advertising than if it
advertises. Therefore, αH = 1, which contradicts Lemma 3.3. Therefore, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. If Φ < min{(VL− cL)(1−2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} holds, the
low quality firm advertises with probability strictly less than one, αL < 1.
This proposition restricts the number of possible equilibria. Either both
firms advertise with probability less than one or the high quality firm advertises
with probability one and the low quality firm advertises with probability less
than one. All cases will be discussed in the following subsections.
Both Firms Use Mixed Advertising Strategies
The following proposition establishes an equilibrium in which both firms adver-
tise with probability strictly less than one.
Proposition 3.3. If
[VH−cH−(VL−cL)](1−2λ) ≤ Φ < min
{
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ), (VH − cH)
(
1
2 − λ
)}
(3.6)
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holds, there exists a unique equilibrium. The firms advertise with probabilities
αL = 1− 2Φ(VH − cH)(1− 2λ) (3.7)
αH = 2
[
(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− Φ
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ)
]
− 1. (3.8)
If the firms advertise, they use the pricing strategies
FL(p) =
1
1− 2Φ(1−2λ)(VH−cH)
(
1− (VL − p)λ+ 2Φ(p+ VH − VL − cH)(1− 2λ)
)
(3.9)
FH(p) =
1
2
[
(VH−cH)(1−2λ)−Φ
(VL−cL)(1−2λ)
]
− 1
·
(
1− (VH − p)λ− [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ) + 2Φ(p− (VH − VL)− cL)(1− 2λ)
)
(3.10)
on the supports[
VL − (VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− 2Φ1− λ , VL
]
and
[
VH − (VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− 2Φ1− λ , VH
]
,
respectively. If the firms do not advertise they set their price equal to VL and
VH , respectively.
The left hand side on the condition given in (3.6) ensures that none of the
firms advertise with certainty. The right hand side ensures that it is optimal for
both firms to advertise. Since this interval must not be empty for the equilibrium
to exist, the advantage must be sufficiently small. This is exactly the case if
VH − cH < 2(VL− cL). Thus, it is only achievable by the gatekeeper if and only
if the equilibrium in Proposition 3.1 is not achievable.
The equilibrium in Proposition 3.3 includes the equilibrium derived in Baye
and Morgan (2001) for the special case with two firms. Generically, in this
equilibrium the firms advertise with different probabilities if VH−cH > VL−cL.
Moreover, the advertising propensities have the following property.
Proposition 3.4. In the equilibrium in Proposition 3.3, the high quality firm
advertises with larger probability.
Intuitively, the maximal gain from advertising is larger for the high quality
firm, since (VH − cH)(1 − 2λ) − Φ ≥ (VL − cL)(1 − 2λ) − Φ. Hence, the high
quality firm adopts a more aggressive advertising strategy than its competitor.
Furthermore, it is remarkable that both firms advertise more aggressively if
VH − cH increases. That is, firm H’s maximum profits from advertising (VH −
cH)(1 − 2λ) increase and hence, firm H advertises with a larger probability.
However, this decreases the expected profits of abstaining from advertising for
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firm L and hence, it advertises with larger probability too. Surprisingly, the
effect of VL− cL is different. It only decreases the advertising propensity of the
high quality firm. We conclude that the total expected demand for advertising,
αL + αH , increases as the advantage becomes larger.
Proposition 3.5. In the equilibrium in Proposition 3.3, the expected demand
for advertising increases in the advantage.
Finally, we can compare the expected profits. We conclude that firm H’s
expected profits are not smaller than those of the competitor and that the
difference in expected profits increases if the advantage increases.
Proposition 3.6. In the equilibrium established in Proposition 3.3, (i) ΠH −
ΠL ≥ 0 holds; and (ii) the difference is increasing in the advantage.
In this equilibrium, the high quality firm advertises its monopoly price with
positive probability.8 Moreover, the mass point vanishes if the advantage de-
creases, VH − cH − (VL − cL) → 0. Furthermore, the advertising probabilities
approach each other as the advantage decreases.
However, these subgames are not reached if the gatekeeper sets an adver-
tising fee lower than Φ < [VH − VL − (cH − cL](1 − 2λ). We establish these
subgames in the next subsection.
One Pure Advertising Strategy
We now want to establish an equilibrium for low advertising fees, i.e. Φ <
[VH−cH−(VL−cL)](1−2λ). In this equilibrium the high quality firm advertises
with certainty.
Proposition 3.7. If
0 < Φ ≤ [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ)
< min
{
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ), (VH − cH)
(
1
2 − λ
)}
(3.11)
holds, then there exists a unique equilibrium in which the low quality firm ad-
vertises with probability
αL =
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ)− Φ
(VH − cH)(1− 2λ) (3.12)
8Given that the high quality firm advertises, the monopoly price VH is charged with prob-
ability 1− 1
αH
(
αH − VH−cH−(VL−cL)VL−cL
)
> 0.
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and the high quality firm advertises with certainty. If the low quality firm ad-
vertises it uses the pricing distribution
FL(p) =
1
αL
(
1− (VL − p)λ+ [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ) + Φ(p+ VH − VL − cH)(1− 2λ)
)
(3.13)
on the support [
VLλ+ cL(1− 2λ) + Φ
1− λ , VL
]
and charges VL if it does not advertise. The high quality firm sets prices accord-
ing to the pricing distribution
FH(p) = 1− (VH − p)λ+ Φ[p− (VH − VL)− cL](1− 2λ) . (3.14)
on the support [
VH − (VL − cL)(1− 2λ)− Φ1− λ , VH
]
.
Necessarily, VH − cH > VL − cL must hold for the interval for Φ to be
nonempty, which is fulfilled by assumption. Moreover, Φ must not exceed Φ <
min{(VL−cL)(1−2λ), (VH−cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)}. This equilibrium exists for all values
of Φ which have not been discussed above. Therefore, we have derived the unique
equilibrium strategies of the firms for any possible values of Φ.
In the subgames of Propositions 3.7, the low quality firm’s advertising prob-
ability decreases in the advantage. Hence, the expected total demand for ad-
vertising increases if the advantage vanishes.
Proposition 3.8. In the equilibrium established in Proposition 3.7, the expected
demand for advertising decreasess in the advantage.
The reason why the reaction of the demand is different than in the previous
equilibrium is that the high quality firm cannot increase the expected demand
for advertising anymore. Only the low quality firm reacts to changes. It is
interesting that for the two different types of subgames in which both firms
advertise, there are two types of regimes. If the advertising fee is small enough
such that the firms react as described in Proposition 3.7, the expected demand
decreases in the advantage of the high quality firm. However, if the advertising
fee is large enough such that the firms behave as in Proposition 3.3, then the
expected demand is increasing.
Also in this regime, the high quality firm has the larger expected profits and
the difference increases in the advantage.
Proposition 3.9. In the equilibrium established in Proposition 3.7, (i) ΠH −
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ΠL > 0 holds; and (ii) the difference is increasing in the advantage.
Also in these subgames, the high quality firm advertises the monopoly price
with positive probability.9
3.4 The Gatekeeper’s Problem
Now, we can analyze the gatekeeper’s optimization problem. From the analysis
above we know that the gatekeeper can be in one of the two different scenarios. If
VH−cH < 2(VL−cL) holds, then the subgames in which only one firm advertises
are not achievable. Thus, the gatekeeper can only set prices such that both firms
advertise.10 If VH − cH > 2(VL − cL) holds, then the subgames in which both
firms advertise with probability less than one are not achievable. Thus, the
gatekeeper can only set prices such that the high quality firm advertises with
certainty.
The gatekeeper sets Φ so as to maximize the expected profits. These are
given by
ΠG(Φ) = (αL + αH) · Φ− CG. (3.15)
It cannot be optimal for the gatekeeper to set an advertising fee Φ > (VH −
cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
, since the demand would be equal to zero and hence ΠG(Φ) = −CG.
Thus, we only have to consider the range Φ ∈ [0, (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
]. The next
proposition establishes the optimal strategy.
Proposition 3.10. The gatekeeper sets the advertising fee according to
Φ∗ =

(VH−cH)2(1−2λ)
2(VH−cH+VL−cL) if VH − cH ∈ [VL − cL, (VL − cL))
√
2
[VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ) if VH − cH ∈ [
√
2(VL − cL), 2(VL − cL))
(VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
otherwise.
(3.16)
Note, that the gatekeeper’s strategy is continuous in the parameters. Ad-
ditionally, it is interesting that the gatekeeper induces the low quality firm to
abstain from advertising as soon as it is possible. Moreover, we can conclude
that the gatekeeper’s advertising fee increases in the advantage of the high qual-
ity firm.
Proposition 3.11. The advertising fee is increasing in (i) the advantage and
(ii) the number of non-loyals.
9The monopoly price VH is charged with probability Φ(VL−cL)(1−2λ) > 0.10Of course, the gatekeeper could also set a price such that no firm advertises. Obviously,
this will not happen in the equilibrium.
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Clearly, if the number of non-loyal consumers increase, both firms are willing
to pay more for advertising. Thus, the gatekeeper increases its price. The
rationale for the advertising fee being increasing in the advantage, will become
clearer later in the analysis.
3.5 The Equilibrium
First, we establish the subgame perfect equilibrium just depending on the ex-
ogenous variables. Then we analyze the effects of the exogenous parameters on
the expected profits of the gatekeeper. In addition, we will discuss the effects
of the fraction of loyal consumers on the outcome.
3.5.1 The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
To establish the subgame perfect equilibrium, we have to insert the optimal
advertising fees of the gatekeeper into the equilibria in Proposition 3.3 and 3.7
for the respective parameters. From this we get immediately the following result.
Proposition 3.12. If VH − cH ∈ [VL− cL, (VL− cL)
√
2) then there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in which the gatekeeper sets an advertising fee
Φ∗ = (VH − cH)
2(1− 2L)
2(VH − cH + VL − cL)
and the firms use the advertising and pricing strategies presented in Proposition
3.3.
If VH − cH ∈ [(VL − cL)
√
2, 2(VL − cL)), then there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in which the gatekeeper sets an advertising fee
Φ∗ = [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ)
and the firms use the advertising and pricing strategy presented in Proposition
3.7.
If VH − cH ∈ [2(VL − cL),∞), then there is a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium in which the gatekeeper sets an advertising fee
Φ∗ = (VH − cH)
(
1
2 − λ
)
and the high quality firm advertises with certainty and the low quality firms
abstains from advertising. The low quality firm charges VL and the high quality
firm VH .
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Figure 3.1: Different Areas of the Equilibrium
Thus, we have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for all possible combi-
nations of VH − cH and VL − cL. Figure 3.1 depicts all combinations. On the
45-degree-line are all combination for which there is no advantage. In region I
only the high quality firms advertises. In region II and III both firms adver-
tise with positive probability. Whereas in the high quality firm advertises with
certainty and the low quality firm advertises with positive probability strictly
less than one in region II. In region III both firms advertises with probability
less than one. The combinations below the 45-degree-line represent all combi-
nations in which the low quality firm have a advantage, which are excluded by
assumption.11
3.5.2 Comparative Statics
Now, we want to analyze how the strategy of the gatekeeper influences the
advertising behavior of the two firms. Moreover, we want to examine how
expected profits of the gatekeeper respond to changes in the profitability of
firms. Moreover, we do some welfare analysis.
The Expected Profits of the Gatekeeper
In the equilibrium, the gatekeeper raises the advertising fee if VH−cH increases.
However, it does not say something about the advertising behavior of firms.
11If the low quality would have a advantage, then the figure is similar. It is simply mirrored
around the 45-degree-line.
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Proposition 3.13. In the equilibrium, αH is increasing in the advantage if
VH − cH < (VL− cL)
√
2 and constant otherwise; αL is decreasing in the advan-
tage if VH − cH < 2(VL − cL) and constant otherwise.
From Proposition 3.11 we know that the gatekeeper raises the advertising
fee when the advantage increases. Moreover, Proposition 3.13 states that the
gatekeeper does it in such a way that the two advertising intensities drift apart
given that the low quality firm is advertising with positive probability.
The next proposition establishes the central result of this paper. It states
that the gatekeeper prefers markets with larger advantages.
Proposition 3.14. In the equilibrium, the expected profits of the gatekeeper are
increasing in the advantage.
This suggests that an intense price competition which is induced by large
advertising intensities of both firms is not beneficial for the gatekeeper. If VH −
cH−(VL−cL) is small, both firms advertise with similar probabilities. However,
if the advantage increases the gatekeeper increases the advertising fee. This
induces the advertising intensities to drift apart and price competition decreases.
Thus, the sales to the non-loyal consumers are predominantly made by the high
quality firm. If VH − cH exceeds 2(VL− cL) then the gatekeeper charges a price
which induces the low quality firm to abstain from advertising and all the sales
to the non-loyal consumers are made by the high quality firm.
It seems to be natural, that the gatekeeper can benefit from the fact that a
firm in the market becomes more profitable, that is VH−cH +VL−cL increases,
since its willingness to pay for advertising increases. The next proposition es-
tablishes this.
Proposition 3.15. In the equilibrium, the expected profits are increasing in the
aggregate profitability of the firms, when the advantage is kept constant.
Therefore, the gatekeeper benefits if the aggregate profitability increases
given that the advantage does not increase. However, the gatekeeper’s expected
profits do not generally increase in the aggregate profitability. The next propo-
sition establishes that the gatekeepers profits can decrease in the advantage.
Proposition 3.16. In the equilibrium, the expected profits are decreasing in
VL − cL if VH − cH < 2(VL − cL) and constant otherwise.
This underlines the role of the advantage. Even if the aggregate profitability
increases, the gatekeeper does not benefit from it. The rationale for this is that
price competition becomes more intensive if the firm L becomes more profitable
(given that the low quality firm advertises with positive probability). Thus firms
are less willing to pay for the advertisement.
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Furthermore, the expected profits of the gatekeeper are increasing in the
fraction of non-loyal consumers.
Proposition 3.17. The expected profits of the gatekeeper increase in the frac-
tion of non-loyal consumers.
The equilibrium advertising propensities are decreasing in the advantage.
However, the gatekeeper’s advertising fee decreases in the fraction of loyal con-
sumers. Hence, the expected profits of the gatekeeper increase if the fraction
of non-loyal customers increase. Moreover, the gatekeeper’s expected profits
approach −CG as λ→ 12 . Thus, the gatekeeper is not active if λ is large.
Social Welfare
Advertising in this model allocates non-loyal consumers to the firm which offers
the largest utility. Hence, non-loyal consumers do profit from advertising as
well as loyal consumers, since they free ride on the information of the non-loyal
consumers. In our model only the existence of the gatekeeper makes it possible
for the firms to compete for non-loyal consumers and hence transfers profits from
firms to the gatekeeper and to the consumers. Thus, firms are worse off with the
gatekeeper and consumers better off. Therefore, the existence of the gatekeeper
redistribution of the profits. Moreover, since VH − cH > VL − cL holds, good
H is the social efficient good. The existence of the gatekeeper makes it possible
that more consumers buy good H instead of good L and thus may enhance
welfare. However, the existence causes fix costs of CG. Therefore, the existence
of a gatekeeper is detrimental to welfare if the advantage is small. However, if
VH − cH ≥ 2(VL − cL), then all the non-loyal in the market L consume good H
instead of good L and thus the existence of the gatekeeper is efficient iff
[VH − cH − (VL − cL)]
(
1
2 − λ
)
− CG ≥ (VL − cL)
(
1
2 − λ
)
− CG ≥ 0.
Thus, the existence of the gatekeeper enhances the social welfare if the ad-
vantage is large enough.
3.6 Conclusion
We considered a duopoly market in which the firms are allowed to differ in their
profitability. More precisely, we allowed the firms to offer vertically differenti-
ated goods and to be different in costs. We analyzed the case when the high
quality firm has an advantage. That is, it has a larger profitability. Moreover,
each firm is a monopolist in a local market. However, through the existence
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of the gatekeeper the firms can compete for a part of the consumers who have
access to the gatekeeper’s website.
We have shown, that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
which the firm with the advantage advertises more aggressively than its com-
petitor. Moreover, in those subgames in which both firms advertise, there is a
regime switch. If the advertising fee is small, the demand for advertising de-
creases in the advantage. If the advertising fee is large, then the demand for
advertising is increasing in the advantage. Furthermore, the expected profits of
the high quality firm is larger than those of her competitor and the difference
increase if the advantage increases.
If the advantage of the high quality firm is small, then the advertising fee
set by the gatekeeper is such that both firms advertise with positive probability
less than one. For a moderate advantage the gatekeeper sets the advertising fee
such that the high quality firm advertises with certainty. Moreover, for large
advantages, the gatekeeper sets prices such that the low quality firm does not
advertise. Only the high quality firm advertises with certainty. The gatekeeper
benefits from a large advantage, since it can set the fee such that the advertis-
ing propensities drift apart and thus price competition becomes less intensive.
Therefore, the firm’s are more willing to pay for advertising. Thus, the gate-
keeper can extract larger rents from the firms. Therefore, the expected profits
of the gatekeeper are increasing in the advantage. Moreover, given any advan-
tage, the firms are more willing to pay for advertisements if their profitability
increases. This can be exploited by the gatekeeper. However, aggregate prof-
itability of the firms is not in general advantageous for the gatekeeper. An
increase in the aggregate profitability can decrease the gatekeeper’s expected
profits if the advantage decreases, since price competition intensifies. In ad-
dition, the expected profits increase in the fraction of consumers who can be
reached via advertising (non-loyal consumers).
Moreover, if the advantage is large, the existence of the gatekeeper increases
the social welfare, since all non-loyal consumers purchase the socially efficient
good. Thus, this increase in efficiency exceeds the fix costs of the gatekeeper.
This indicates that gatekeepers are more likely to occur in markets in which
firms have large differences in profitabilities. Thus, in the market with sym-
metric firms analyzed by Baye and Morgan (2001), it is most unlikely to find
gatekeepers. Moreover, a social planner should prohibit gatekeepers to enter
symmetric markets in our model.
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3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Assume both firms do not advertise their prices. Then both firms attract
one half of the consumers. Since firm i knows the consumers reservation price
Vi at which the consumers are willing to purchase the good, firm i does not have
an incentive to charge a lower price.
Now, we want to show that lower prices than VH cannot be optimal for firm
H if firm H does not advertise. Assume it is optimal. Then firm H attracts
half of the consumers if the competitor does not advertise independently of the
price charged. Hence any price smaller than VH cannot belong to an optimal
strategy. However, even if the other firm advertises, the fraction of consumer
attracted by firm H does only depend on the price advertised by firm L. If firm
L advertises a price larger than VL, then H attracts one half of the consumers.
If firm L advertises a price not larger than VL, then the firm H attracts only a
fraction λ. Thus the number of consumers attracted by firm H is independent
of the price charged by firm H. Therefore, firm H has no incentive to charge
prices lower than VH .
Showing that firm L charges VL if it does not advertise, is analogous.
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. If firm L has an incentive to advertise, also firm H has an incentive to
advertise, since
(VH − cH)
(
1
2 − λ
)
− Φ > (VL − cL)
(
1
2 − λ
)
− Φ ≥ 0
holds. Thus, the only equilibrium in which one firm advertises is one in which
firm H advertises. Furthermore, in such an equilibrium firm H does not adver-
tise prices lower than VH . Moreover, in the equilibrium Φ must be such that
firm L does not advertise. Thus, Φ must satisfy
(VL − cL) (1− 2λ)− Φ ≤ 0.
The rest follows immediately.
3.A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. Note that advertising is generally profitable for both firms, that is (Vi−
ci)
( 1
2 − λ
)
> Φ holds. Hence, it can not be optimal for both firms to abstain
from advertising. Assume now, firm i advertises with probability zero and firm
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j advertises with positive probability. Therefore, firm j knows, that it attracts
the maximal consumers it can get, (1 − λ), if it charges prices not larger Vj .
Hence, the only price it advertises is Vj . However, there exists an  > 0 such
that (Vi −  − ci)(1 − 2λ) − Φ > (Vi − ci)
( 1
2 − λ
) − Φ > 0. Thus, there is no
equilibrium in which one firm does not advertise at all.
3.A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. Assume that both firms advertise with probability one. First, we note
that the upper bound of the price range advertised by both firms must be such
that p¯H = p¯L + (VH − VL). If this would not be the case then one firm would
never attract consumers if it charges the upper bound.
Consider now, that firm i charges the upper bound of the price distribution
of firm p¯i. If firm j does not have a mass point at p¯j , then it attracts (1 − λ)
consumers with probability 1 − Fj(p¯j) = 0. Therefore, firm i would strictly
prefer to abstain from advertising instead of advertising price p¯i. If firm j has
a mass point at p¯j , then firm i’s expected profits from charging p¯i are given by
(p¯i − ci)[1− Fj(p¯j)]{λ+ 1−2λ2 } − Φ. However, there exists an  > 0 such that
(p¯i−−ci){λ+[1−Fj(p¯j−)](1−2λ)}−Φ > (p¯i−ci){λ+[1−Fj(p¯j)]
(
1
2 − λ
)
}−Φ.
Therefore, it cannot be optimal for firm i to charge the upper bound p¯i. Conse-
quently, there does not exist an equilibrium in which both firm advertise with
certainty.
3.A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, both firms advertise in the equilibrium if Φ < min{(VL−
cL)(1− 2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)}.
First, we want to show that at least one firm uses a mixed pricing strategy
when it advertises. By contradiction, assume that both firms use deterministic
pricing strategies given that they advertise, which we denote as pˆi for i = 1, 2.
pˆL < pˆH − VH − VL cannot hold, since the low quality firm could charge a
price pˆL +  for  > 0 small enough that pˆL +  < pˆH − VH − VL holds, which
still attracts all non-loyals when it advertises. A similar argument holds for
pˆL > pˆH − VH − VL. If pˆL = pˆH − VH − VL holds, then both firms attracts half
of the non-loyals. Thus, both firms have an incentive to decrease the price by a
small amount to attract all non-loyals. Therefore, at least one firm use a mixed
pricing strategy in the equilibrium.
Suppose that the high quality firm uses a deterministic pricing strategy pˆH
when she advertises and the low quality firm uses a mixed pricing strategy FL(·)
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when she advertises. Then consider  > 0 and two prices pˆH − (VH − VL) + 
and pˆH − (VH − VL) − . The difference of the expected profits of these two
prices is
[pˆ−(VH−VL)−−cL](1−λ)− [pˆ−(VH−VL)+−cL] · [λ+(1−αH)(1−2λ)] > 0
for  small enough. Therefore, for some  prices in the interval [pˆH − (VH −
VL), pˆH − (VH − VL) + ] cannot belong to the support of the optimal pricing
distribution of firm L. Hence, firm H can increase its deterministic price pˆH
without loosing consumers. This contradicts optimality. Moreover, pˆH = VH
cannot hold, then the low quality firm does not advertise price VL, since there
exist an  > 0 such that (VL − − cL)(1− 2λ)− Φ > 0.
Similarly, it is not optimal for firm L to use a deterministic pricing strategy
when firm H uses a mixed advertised pricing strategy.
3.A.6 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof. Assume that the difference of the lower bounds is not equal to the differ-
ence of the products’ qualities, VH − VL. First, we assume pH − pL < VH − VL.
Then, firm H attracts all shoppers if it advertises a price p
H
. That is, the
profits are given by (p
H
− cH)(1− λ)− Φ. However, then there exists an  > 0
sufficiently small such that
(p
H
− cH)(1− λ)− Φ < (pH + − cH)(1− λ)− Φ,
since VH − pH > VL − pL.
Similarly, we can show that p
H
− p
L
> VH − VL cannot be optimal. Hence,
in any equilibrium we must have p
H
− p
L
= VH − VL.
3.A.7 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof. Suppose firm H has a mass point in the interval [p
H
, VH). First, we
suppose that the mass point of firm H is at p
H
. Then firm L’s expected profits
of charging the lower bound p
L
are given by (p
L
− cL){αHFH(pH) 12 + [1 −
αHFH(pH)](1 − λ)}, by Lemma 3.5. Consequently, there exists an  > 0 such
that
(p
L
− − cL)(1− λ) >(pL − cL)
{
αHFH(pH)
1
2 + [1− αHFH(pH)](1− λ)
}
>(p
L
+ − cL){αHFH(pH + )λ+ [1− αHFH(pH + )](1− λ)}.
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Thus, the interval [p
L
, p
L
+ ) cannot belong to the support of firm L. Hence,
firm H can increase p
H
without loosing consumers. This contradicts optimality.
Therefore, there cannot be a mass point at p
H
.
Suppose that firm H has a mass point at pm ∈ (p
H
, VH). Consider a small
 > 0. For  small enough, the prices pm− (VH −VL)+  and pm− (VH −VL)− 
the expected profits fulfill
[pm − (VH − VL)− − cL]{FH(pm − (VH − VL)− )λ
+ [1− FH(pm − (VH − VL)− )](1− λ)}
−[pm − (VH − VL) + − cL]{FH(pm − (VH − VL) + )λ
+ [1− FH(pm − (VH − VL) + )](1− λ)} > 0,
since firm H has a mass point at pm. Therefore, for some  > 0, prices in the
interval [pm − (VH − VL), pm − (VH − VL) + ] cannot belong to the support of
the optimal pricing distribution of firm L. Hence, firm H can increase its mass
point without loosing consumers. This increases the expected profits of firm L,
which contradicts optimality.
The proof that firm L has no mass point in the interval [p
L
, VL) is analogous.
3.A.8 Proof of Lemma 3.7
Proof. By Lemma 3.6, both pricing distributions do not have mass points on
[p
i
, Vi) for i = H,L. Suppose firm H’s equilibrium strategy distribution is not
connected from (p1, p2). Then it is not optimal for firm L to charge prices in
the interval (p1−(VH−VL), p2−(VH−VL)), since all prices in the interval yield
the same number of expected consumers. However, it cannot be optimal for
firm H to charge a price p1, since it can charge prices in the interval p ∈ (p1, p2)
without loosing consumers, but increase the profit per sale to (p − cH). This
contradicts optimality. Hence, the support of the equilibrium distribution of
firm H must be connected. Similar arguments hold for firm L.
3.A.9 Proof of Lemma 3.8
Proof. Suppose both firms have a mass point at Vi for i = H,L. Because of
the implied discontinuity of Fi(·), there exists an  > 0 such that the following
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holds:
(Vj − − cj){αiFi(Vi − )λ+[1− αiFi(Vi)](1− λ)}
− (Vj − cj)
{
αiFi(Vi)λ+ [1− αiFi(Vi)]12
}
> 0.
Hence, if firm i has an atom at Vi, it is not optimal for firm j to charge Vj .
3.A.10 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. The high quality firm has an advantage, that is VH−cH− (VL−cL) > 0.
By contradiction we assume that αL = 1. Thus, it follows by Lemma 3.3, that
αH < 1. Moreover, we have p˜L > p˜H − (VH − VL). That is,
(VL − cL)[λ+ (1− αH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
] + Φ
1− λ + cL >
(VH − cH)λ+ Φ
1− λ + cH − (VH −VL)
holds. This can be seen more easily if we simplify the inequality to
(VL − cL)
[
λ+ (1− αH)
(
1
2 − λ
)]
+ [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ) > 0.
This holds since we assumed VH − cH − (VL − cL) > 0. However, by Lemma
3.5 and p˜L > p˜H − (VH − VL), we have pL > p˜H − (VH − VL). However,
then the high quality firm can advertise a price p
L
+ VH − VL which attracts a
fraction of 1− λ of the consumers. Hence, the profits are ΠAH(pL + VH − VL) =
(p
L
+ VH − VL − cH)(1 − λ) − Φ > (VH − cH)λ = ΠNH(VH). However, then a
mixed advertising strategy αH < 1 cannot be optimal since the high quality
firm strictly prefers to advertise. Which contradicts αH < 1.
3.A.11 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Suppose that αi < 1 for i = 1, 2. Hence, advertising and not advertising
VH yield the same expected profits for firm H. Therefore, we have
(VH − cH)
[
λ+ (1− αL)
(
1
2 − λ
)]
= (VH − cH) [λ+ (1− αL)(1− 2λ)]− Φ
(3A.1)
and hence we obtain the unique equilibrium advertising propensity of firm L
αL = 1− 2Φ(1− 2λ)(VH − cH) .
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Moreover, the difference of the lowest prices which the firms are willing to ad-
vertise must be equal to VH − VL. That is, the following holds
(VH − cH)[λ+ (1− αL)
( 1
2 − λ
)
] + Φ
1− λ + cH
=
(VL − cL)[λ+ (1− αH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
] + Φ
1− λ + cL + VH − VL. (3A.2)
We can insert αL and solve for αH . We obtain the unique advertising propensity
of firm H
αH = 2
[
(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− Φ
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ)
]
− 1.
Any advertised price charged by firm L yields the same expected profits as
abstaining from advertising. That is
(VL − cL)
[
λ+ (1− αH)1− 2λ2
]
= (p− cL) [λ+ (1− αHFH(p+ VH − VL))(1− 2λ)]− Φ. (3A.3)
holds. Expressing FH(p+ VH − VL) yields the unique advertised pricing distri-
bution
FH(p+ VH − VL) = 1
αH
(
1− (VL − p)λ+ (VL − cL)(1− αH)
1−2λ
2 + Φ
(p− cL)(1− 2λ)
)
and hence we receive the equilibrium distribution
FH(p) =
1
αH
(
1− (VH − p)λ+ (VL − cL)(1− αH)
1−2λ
2 + Φ
(p− (VH − VL)− cL)(1− 2λ)
)
,
which is the same as
FH(p) =
1
αH
(
1− (VH − p)λ− [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ) + 2Φ(p− (VH − VL)− cL)(1− 2λ)
)
.
The lower bound fulfills FH(pH) = 0 and hence we get
p
H
= VH − (VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− 2Φ1− λ .
The c.d.f. at the upper bound becomes FH(VH) = 1αH
(
αH − VH−cH−(VL−cL)VL−cL
)
and is smaller one, since VH − cH − (VL − cL) > 0 holds.
Moreover, any priced charged by firm H yields the same profits as not ad-
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vertising. Thus, we have
(VH − cH)
[
λ+ (1− αL)
(
1
2 − λ
)]
= (p− cH) {λ+ [1− αLFL(p− (VH − VL))](1− 2λ)} − Φ. (3A.4)
Hence, we have the unique advertised pricing strategy of firm L
FL(p) =
1
1− 2Φ(1−2λ)(VH−cH)
(
1− (VL − p)λ+ 2Φ(p+ VH − VL − cH)(1− 2λ)
)
.
It is easy to see that FL(VL) = 1. Moreover, for the lower bound FL(pL) = 0,
hence we can calculate
p
L
= VL − (VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− 2Φ1− λ .
Finally, we have to verify when 0 < αL < 1 and 0 < αH ≤ 1 holds. That is,
0 < Φ < (VH−cH)(1−2λ)2 and [VH−cH− (VL−cL)](1−2λ) ≤ Φ < (VH−cH)(1−2λ)2 .
Since equations (3A.1), (3A.2), (3A.3) and (3A.4) must hold in this equilib-
rium, αi and Fi(·) are uniquely defined for i = 1, 2 and thus the equilibrium is
unique.
3.A.12 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. We want to show that αH − αL ≥ 0. Thus, we have
αH − αL =2(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− φ(VL − cL)(1− 2λ) − 1−
(
1− 2φ(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)
)
=2
(
VH − cH
VL − cL −
[VH − cH − (VL − cL)]
(VH − cH)(VL − cL)(1− 2λ)
)
=2[VH − cH − (VL − cL)] · [(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− φ](VH − cH)(VL − cL)(1− 2λ) ≥ 0. (3A.5)
The inequality follows from the fact, that for the equilibrium in Proposition 3.3
φ < (VH − cH)(1− 2λ).
3.A.13 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof. The expected amount of advertising is given by
αL + αH = 2− 2
[
1− (VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− Φ(VL − cL)(1− 2λ)
]
− 2Φ(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)
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which derivative with respect to VH − cH is given by
∂(αL + αH)
∂(VH − cH) =
(1− 2λ)
(1− 2λ)(VL − cL) +
2Φ
(VH − cH)2(1− 2λ) > 0
and the derivative with respect to VL − cL is given by
∂(αL + αH)
∂(VL − cL) = −
(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− Φ
(VL − cL)2(1− 2λ) < 0.
These two derivatives establish the result.
3.A.14 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. Since the low quality firm uses a mixed strategy, the expected profits
of the low quality firm are simply given by the expected profits if it does not
advertise. That is
ΠL = ΠNL =(VL − cL)
[
2− 2(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− Φ(VL − cL)(1− 2λ)
(
1
2 − λ
)]
=(VL − cL)λ− [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− λ) + Φ
and the profits of the high quality firm are given by
ΠH = ΠNH = (VH − cH)
[
λ+ 2Φ(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)
(
1
2 − λ
)]
= (VH − cH)λ+ Φ.
Hence, the difference is given by
ΠH −ΠL = [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− λ) > 0.
Obviously it increases as the advantage increases.
3.A.15 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. Suppose αH = 1. By Lemma 3.3 αL < 1. Thus, we must have that
p˜H − (VH − VL) ≤ p˜L holds, which is
(VH − cH)
[
λ+ (1− αL)
( 1
2 − λ
)]
+ Φ
1− λ +cH−(VH−VL) ≤
(VL − cL)λ+ Φ
1− λ +cL.
This can be reduced to
−[VH − cH − 2(VL − cL)](1− 2λ) ≤ (VH − cH)αL(1− 2λ).
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Any price charged by firm L fulfills
(p− cL) [λ+ (1− FH(p+ VH − VL)(1− 2λ)]− Φ = (VL − cL)λ. (3A.6)
From this condition we can express the unique advertised pricing strategy, which
is
FH(p+ VH − VL) = 1− (VL − p)λ+ Φ(p− cL)(1− 2λ) .
Hence we have
FH(p) = 1− (VH − p)λ+ Φ(p− (VH − VL)− cL)(1− 2λ) .
Since the lower bound fulfills FH(pH) = 0, we obtain
p
H
= VH − (VL − cL)(1− 2λ)− Φ1− λ
For the upper bound, VH , we have FH(VH) = 1− Φ(VL−cL)(1−2λ) < 1, since Φ > 0
holds by assumption.
If firm H charges the lower bound p
H
it must have the same expected profits
as any other price charged, which is
(p
H
− cH)(1− λ)− Φ = (p− cH) [λ+ (1− αLFL(p− (VH − VL))(1− 2λ)]− Φ.
(3A.7)
Hence, we can express the unique advertised pricing strategy
FL(p− (VH − VL)) = 1
αL
(
1− (pH − cH)(1− λ)− (p− cH)λ(p− cH)(1− 2λ)
)
and then have
FL(p) =
1
αL
(
1− (pH − cH)(1− λ)− (p+ VH − VL − cH)λ(p+ VH − VL − cH)(1− 2λ)
)
and by inserting for p
H
we have
FL(p) =
1
αL
(
1− (VL − p)λ+ [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ) + Φ(p+ VH − VL − cH)(1− 2λ)
)
and the lower bound is given by
p
L
= VLλ+ cL(1− 2λ) + Φ1− λ .
Furthermore, charging the lower bound must yield the same expected profits
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as charging the upper bound. Hence, we have
(p
H
− cH)(1− λ)− Φ = (VH − cH) [λ+ (1− αL)(1− 2λ)]− Φ. (3A.8)
By inserting for p
H
and solving for αL, we obtain
αL =
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ)− Φ
(VH − cH)(1− 2λ) .
Since equations (3A.6), (3A.7) and (3A.8) must hold, the strategies are
uniquely defined and thus the equilibrium is unique.
3.A.16 Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof. The expected demand for advertising is given by
αL + αH =
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ)− Φ
(VH − cH)(1− 2λ) + 1.
It can easily be seen that ∂(αL+αH)∂(VH−cH) < 0. This establishes the result.
3.A.17 Proof of Proposition 3.9
Proof. Since the low quality firm mixes between advertising and not advertising,
the expected profits are given by the expected profits of non-advertising, which
is simply ΠL = ΠNL = (VL − cL)λ. The low quality firm advertises VL with
probability zero. Hence, the expected profits of the high quality firm are given
by
ΠH = ΠAH = (VH − cH)
[
λ+
(
1− (VL − cL)(1− 2λ)− Φ(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)
)
(1− 2λ)
]
− Φ
= (VH − cH)λ+ [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ).
Therefore, the difference of the expected profits is given by
ΠH −ΠL = [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− λ) > 0,
Obviously, the difference is increasing in the advantage.
3.A.18 Proof of Proposition 3.10
Our strategy is to restrict the advertising fee such that it can only be chosen
in the valid interval for each of the three different categories of subgames. Af-
terwards, we will combine these constrained choices of the advertising fee. We
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start with the subgames in which only one firm advertises.
The Subgames with One Advertising Firm
If only the high quality firm advertises, then the only possible equilibrium can-
didate is the one in which the gatekeeper extracts all rents from advertising.
Hence, we can establish the following equilibrium.
Lemma 3.9. If VH − cH ≥ 2(VL − cL) holds, then the gatekeeper sets the
advertising fee
Φ∗ = (VH − cH)
(
1
2 − λ
)
.
Proof. Assume that the gatekeeper’s advertising fee is restricted to the interval
(VL − cL)(1 − 2λ) ≤ Φ ≤ (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
and that it is nonempty. More-
over, assume that the firms use the strategies described in Proposition 3.1. By
contradiction assume that the gatekeeper sets a price Φ < (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
.
Then the expected demand is one. However, we can find an  > 0 small enough
for which
ΠG(Φ + ) = Φ + − CG > Φ− CG = ΠG(Φ).
Hence, Φ < (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
cannot be optimal.
However, these subgames are only achievable if (VL − cL)(1− 2λ) ≤ (VH −
cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)
, which is the case if VH − cH ≥ 2(VL − cL).
The Subgames of Proposition 3.3
Now, we consider that the two firms behave as in Proposition 3.3. That is, we
restrict Φ to be in the interval described in condition (3.6). We can establish
the following.
Lemma 3.10. If VH − cH < 2(VL − cL) holds, then the gatekeeper uses the
strategy
Φ∗ =

(VH−cH)2(1−2λ)
2(VH−cH+VL−cL) if VH − cH ≤ (VL − cL)
√
2
[VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ) otherwise.
(3A.9)
Proof. Assume that the firms use the equilibrium strategies described in Propo-
sition 3.3. This results into the following maximization problem of the gate-
keeper.
max
Φ∈[[VH−cH−(VL−cL)](1−2λ),min{(VL−cL)(1−2λ),(VH−cH)(1−2λ)/2}]
ΠG(Φ),
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whereas
ΠG(Φ) =
{
2(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)− Φ(VL − cL)(1− 2λ) −
2Φ
(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)
}
Φ− CG
Taking the first derivative with respect to Φ and setting it equal to zero yields
∂ΠG(Φ)
∂Φ = 2 + 2
VH − cH − (VL − cL)
VL − cL −
8Φ
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ) = 0
and after solving for Φ we receive
Φ∗ = (VH − cH)
2(1− 2λ)
2(VH − cH + VL − cL) ,
which is the maximizer since ∂
2ΠG(Φ)
∂Φ2 < 0. However, we have to check when
this solution lies in the appropriate range for the equilibrium in Proposition 3.3.
That is
[VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ) ≤ (VH − cH)
2(1− 2λ)
2(VH − cH + VL − cL)
which can be represented by
VH − cH ≤ (VL − cL)
√
2.
For this equilibrium to exist, the interval for Φ for which this equilibrium
exist must not be nonempty. That is,
[VH−cH−(VL−cL)](1−2λ) < min
{
(VL − cL)(1− 2λ), (VH − cH)
(
1
2 − λ
)}
,
which results into VH − cH < 2(VL − cL).
Hence, the gatekeeper’s strategy is given by
Φ∗ =

(VH−cH)2(1−2λ)
2(VH−cH+VL−cL) if VH − cH ≤ (VL − cL)
√
2
[VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ). otherwise
The Subgames of Proposition 3.7
Now we consider that both firms use the strategies as described in the equi-
librium in Proposition 3.7. That is we restrict the possible advertising fee to
the set Φ ∈ (0, [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ)]. Therefore, we can establish the
following result.
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Lemma 3.11. If 2(VL − cL) > VH − cH holds, then the gatekeeper sets the
advertising fee equal to
Φ∗ = [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ). (3A.10)
Proof. If VH − cH − (VL − cL) > 0, then the equilibrium in Proposition 3.7
can only exist if the high quality firm advertises with certainty. That is, the
gatekeeper’s maximization problem becomes
max
Φ∈(0,[VH−cH−(VL−cL)](1−2λ)]
ΠG(Φ) =
(
1 + (VL − cL)(1− 2λ)− Φ(VH − cH)(1− 2λ)
)
Φ− CG.
Differentiating with respect to Φ and setting the derivative equal to zero yields
∂ΠG(Φ)
∂Φ = 1 +
VL − cL
VH − cH −
2Φ
(VH − cH)(1− 2λ) = 0,
which implies that the maximizer (by the fact that ∂
2ΠG(Φ)
∂Φ2 < 0) is given by
Φ = (VH − cH + VL − cL) 1−2λ2 . However, this maximizer does not fulfill (VL −
cL)(1− 2λ) > Φ. Consequently, we must have a corner solution, which is
Φ∗ = [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ).
It fulfills the assumption Φ∗ < min{(VL − cL)(1 − 2λ), (VH − cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)} if
VH − cH < 2(VL − cL).
We can combine these results to derive the complete strategy of the gate-
keeper.
Proof. We want to combine Lemma 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. Suppose VH − cH <
2(VL− cL), then either the strategy of 3.10 and 3.11 can be optimal. Hence, the
only optimal strategy for the interval VH − cH ∈
(
(VL − cL)
√
2, 2(VL − cL)
)
is
Φ∗ = [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ).
Moreover, if VH − cH ≤
√
2(VL − cL) then [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1 − 2λ) ≤
(VH−cH)2(1−2λ)
2(VH−cH+VL−cL) . That is,
Φ∗ = (VH − cH)
2(1− 2λ)
2(VH − cH + VL − cL)
is an interior solution and optimal for VH−cH ∈ (VL−cL, (VL−cL)
√
2. Finally,
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if VH − cH > 2(VL − cL), then the only advertising fee which can be optimal is
Φ∗(VH − cH)
(
1
2 − λ
)
.
.
3.A.19 Proof of Proposition 3.11
Proof. The advertising fee of the gatekeeper is Φ∗ = (VH−cH)(1−2λ)
2
(
1+ VL−cLVH−cH
) if VH−cH <
√
2(VL−cL) holds. It is easy to see that Φ∗ is increasing in VH−cH . Obviously,
it is also increases when Φ ≥ √2(VL − cL).
Moreover, all prices for the three different areas of VH−cH depend negatively
on the number of loyal consumers. Thus, the price is increasing in the number
of non-loyal consumers.
3.A.20 Proof of Proposition 3.13
Proof. If VH − cH ∈ [VL − cL, (VL − cL)
√
2), then the equilibrium advertising
intensities are given by
αH =
VH − cH
VL − cL −
VL − cL
VH − cH + VL − cL and
αL =
VL − cL
VH − cH + VL − cL .
The first derivatives with respect to VH − cH are given by
∂αH
∂VH − cH =
1
VL − cL +
VL − cL
(VH − cH + VL − cL)2 > 0 and
∂αL
∂VH − cH = −
VL − cL
(VH − cH + VL − cL)2 < 0.
If VH − cH ∈ [(VL− cL)
√
2, 2(VL− cL)), then the equilibrium advertising inten-
sities are given by αH = 1 and
αL = 2
VL − cL
VH − cH − 1.
Obviously the advertising intensity αH is constant in VH − cH and the first
derivative of αL with respect to VH − cH is
∂αL
∂VH − cH = −2
VL − cL
(VH − cH)2 < 0
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Moreover, if VH − cH ≥ 2(VL− cL) holds, αH = 1 and αL = 0 and are obviously
constant in VH − cH .
3.A.21 Proof of Proposition 3.14
Proof. Suppose that VH−cH ∈ (VL−cL, (VL−cL)
√
2), then the expected profits
of the gatekeeper are given by
ΠG =
VH − cH
VL − cL
(VH − cH)2(1− 2λ)
2(VH − cH + VL − cL) − CG =
(VH − cH)2(1− 2λ)
2(VL − cL + (VL−cL)2VH−cH )
− CG.
(3A.11)
The last expression is easy to analyze. The nominator is increasing in VH − cH
and the denominator is decreasing in VH − cH , therefore the expected profits
increase in VH − cH .
Assume that VH − cH ∈ [(VL − cL)
√
2, 2(VL − cL)), then the profits of the
gatekeeper are given by
ΠG = 2
VL − cL
VH − cH [VH − cH − (VL − cL)](1− 2λ)− CG
= 2
[
(VL − cL)− (VL − cL)
2
VH − cH
]
(1− 2λ)− CG. (3A.12)
We take the derivative with respect to VH − cH and obtain ∂ΠG∂(VH−cH) = 4(1 −
2λ) (VL−cL)
2
(VH−cH)2 > 0. Hence, the expected profits are strictly increasing in the
advantage.
If VH−cH ≥ 2(VL−cL), then the expected profits of the gatekeeper are given
by ΠG = (VH−cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)−CG. Obviously, they are increasing in VH−cH .
3.A.22 Proof of Proposition 3.15
Proof. Suppose that VH−cH ∈ (VL−cL, (VL−cL)
√
2), then the expected profits
are given by expression (3A.11). This can be rewritten to
ΠG =
1− 2λ
2
(VH − cH)3
(VL − cL)[VH − cH − (VL − cL)] − CG.
Since the fraction (VH−cH)
3
VL−cL is increasing when VH − cH and VL − cL increase
at the same absolute amount, ΠG is increasing in the aggregate profitability if
the advantage is kept constant.
Suppose now, that VH − cH ∈ [(VL − cL)
√
2, 2(VL − cL)), then the expected
profits of the gatekeeper are given by expression (3A.12). The expected profits
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can be rewritten to
ΠG = 2(1− 2λ) VL − cL
VH − cH [VH − cH − (VL − cL)]− CG.
Since VL−cLVH−cH is increasing when VH − cH and VL− cL are increased by the same
amount, when VH − cH − (VL− cL) is kept constant, ΠG is increasing when the
profitability increases and the advantage is kept constant.
Finally, if VH−cH ≥ 2(VL−cL), the expected profits ΠG = (VH−cH)
( 1
2 − λ
)−
CG are increasing when VH−cH and VL−cL are increased by the same absolute
amount.
3.A.23 Proof of Proposition 3.16
Proof. Suppose that VH−cH ∈ [VL−cL, (VL−cL)
√
2), then the expected profits
are given by expression (3A.11). It can easily be seen that the denominator
increases in VL − cL and thus the whole expression decreases in it.
Suppose now, that VH − cH ∈ [(VL − cL)
√
2, 2(VL − cL)), then the expected
profits of the gatekeeper are given by expression (3A.12). The first derivative
with respect to VL−cL yields ∂ΠG∂(VL−cL) = 2(1−2L)(1−2 VL−cLVH−cH which is smaller
zero for VH − cH < 2(VL − cL).
Finally, if VH−cH ≥ 2(VL−cL), the expected profits ΠG = (VH−cH)
( 1
2 − L
)−
CG are constant in VL − cL.
3.A.24 Proof of Proposition 3.17
Proof. If one inserts the optimal advertising fee into the equilibrium propensi-
ties, one can find out that the equilibrium propensities are independent from λ.
If VH − cH ∈ [VL − cL,
√
2(VL − cL)) the propensities are
αL =
VL − cL
VH − cH + VL − cL <
1
2
αH =
VH − cH
VL − cL −
VL − cL
VH − cH + VL − cL < 1
and if VH − cH ∈ [
√
2(VL − cL), 2(VL − cL)), then there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in which
αL = 2
VL − cL
VH − cH − 1 < 1
αH = 1
and constant otherwise. However, the gatekeeper’s advertising fee is decreasing
in λ. The result follows immediately.
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Chapter 4
Persuasive Advertising with
Spillovers and Semicollusion
4.1 Introduction
The effects of collusive behavior has been well understood if firms have a one-
dimensional action space, e.g. price or quantity. However, in many markets
firms have to decide about more than one variable, such as capacities, R&D
and in particular advertising. Thus, there is the opportunity for competing
firms to cooperate in one dimension and to compete in the other. The so called
semicollusion is of particular interest for firms if cooperation in the use of one
strategic variable can easily be monitored by antitrust authorities, but not the
cooperation in other variables. In the growing literature about semicollusion,
persuasive advertising has widely been ignored.1 However, a large fraction of
advertisements does not explicitly provide information such as quality or prices
and are therefore likely to be persuasive. In contrast to informative advertis-
ing, persuasive advertising generally leads to higher pricing power of advertising
firms and consequently to larger prices (see for example Bagwell (2005)). On the
one hand noncooperative behavior of the firms may lead to costly advertising
wars and advertising levels may thus be inefficiently high. On the other hand
persuasive advertising creates values for consumers and firms may choose inef-
ficiently low advertising intensities if the effectiveness of advertising to create
pricing power is too low. This raises the question whether social welfare could
be increased if firms cooperate. Moreover, it is natural that firms which use
persuasive advertising are no price takers. Thus, they have multi-dimensional
1To best of my knowledge, the only paper analyzing a semicollusive outcome for a market
with persuasive advertising is provided by Aluf and Shy (2001).
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strategy spaces and semicollusion becomes a possible way of cooperation. That
is, they collude in (at least) one dimension and compete in the other. In this
paper we examine two possible types of semicollusion. That is, either the firms
cooperate in prices, but set advertising levels noncooperatively or they coop-
erate in advertising2 and set the price noncooperatively. We want to study
under which condition semicollusion can be welfare enhancing when the firms
can choose the level of persuasive advertising and the price they set.
We assume a duopoly model with complete information in which firms ad-
vertise to change preferences of the consumers. More precisely, consumers, who
have received no advertisement of a good, have zero willingness to pay for that
good. All consumers who have received an advertisement for a particular good
have the same positive valuation for it. Thus, even if the consumers are as-
sumed to have homogenous preferences ex-ante (without advertisements), the
consumers receive different advertisements and are thus heterogenous ex post.
Since some consumers only receive one advertisement and thus are willing to
pay a positive price only for the good of a particular firm, advertising creates
pricing power. Moreover, we analyze the four possible settings. In the com-
petitive setting, both firms do not cooperate and decide about advertising and
prices noncooperatively. In two other settings firms semicollude. That is, they
collude to set the prices (advertising intensities) which maximize industry prof-
its whereas the advertising intensity (price) is set noncooperatively. This is
called price semicollusion (advertising semicollusion). Moreover, we examine a
setting in which firms set advertising intensities and prices cooperatively. That
is, they fully collude. In our model, the optimal strategies of a full collusion are
welfare maximizing.3 As a benchmark case, we first assume that advertising
is a strong tool. That is, a consumer has a high valuation for a firm’s good
only if she has received an advertisement of this firm. In a more general case,
we allow advertisements to have spillovers. More precisely, even though a con-
sumer has only received one advertisement, there is a positive probability that
the consumer also becomes persuaded for both goods. This means, that some
consumers change the valuation for a firm’s good, even though it has perceived
an advertisement from the competitor only. For analytical convenience we as-
sume extreme spillovers, which change the valuation of the consumers for both
goods to the same valuation.
2An example for such a advertising cooperation can be found in Austria. Several firms in
this cooperation serve the same market, like Ariel and Persil which both serve the laundry
detergent market. Companies joining this cooperation can be found on http://www.achten-
sie-auf-die-marke.at.
3This is due to consumers having unit demand. Therefore, the price splits up the revenues
in consumers’ rents and profits. Since in a full collusion the firms set prices such that the whole
rent is captured by the firms, the collusion chooses welfare maximizing advertising intensities.
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We derive symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria of this model.4 Surprisingly,
in the benchmark case without spillovers, the main results are equivalent to that
derived by Simbanegavi (2009) in which advertising is informative. That is, firms
profit from any cooperation5 and semicollusion is always welfare deterring and
advertising semicollusion generates a lower welfare than price semicollusion if
advertising costs are sufficiently low. These findings contradict those of Aluf and
Shy (2001). In their model of persuasive advertising, advertising semicollusion is
welfare enhancing (compared to the noncooperative equilibrium). A reason for
this difference is due to the difference in the underlying advertising technology.
Aluf and Shy assume comparison advertising in which advertising is a tool to
lower the valuation for the competitor’s good. Interestingly, if firms behave
noncooperatively in our model, they choose the welfare maximizing advertising
intensity.
In our model spillovers of advertising weaken the ability of firms to acquire
pricing power. Thus, the firms’ equilibrium advertising intensities are decreas-
ing in the level of spillovers. One consequence is that larger spillovers can
prevent firms to overinvest in advertising. More precisely, price semicollusion
is more profitable and more efficient for intermediate spillovers. Furthermore,
price semicollusion can create the maximum welfare and exceed the welfare
generated by noncooperation and advertising semicollusion for spillovers large
enough. Therefore, our model suggests that antitrust authorities should abstain
from enforcing noncooperative behavior for large spillovers. They should mo-
tivate price cooperation instead. Moreover, full competition generates a larger
welfare than advertising semicollusion for any level of spillovers. Thus, our
model suggests that authorities should heavily monitor advertising activities of
firms such that cooperation in advertising can be prevented.
When there are no spillovers, our results are consistent with the findings
of Simbanegavi (2009). Simbanegavi (2009) assumes a duopoly version of the
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model with informative advertising. He finds that
semicollusion is always detrimental to welfare, but advertising is more harmful
than price semicollusion when advertising costs are low enough. Firms do always
benefit from semicollusion.
The only work which examines semicollusion of persuasive advertising is that
of Aluf and Shy (2001). Advertising here lowers the utility of the consumers
for the competitor’s good and creates heterogeneity among consumers. Firms
advertise more aggressively when they semicollude on prices. Moreover, the
equilibrium prices and expected profits are larger.
4Actually, we also show below that there exists a model with informative advertising in
which the same strategies form the equilibria.
5Fershtman and Gandal (1994) show that this is not necessarily the case when firms semi-
collude.
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Nakata (2006) studies informative advertising with spillovers in a dynamic
framework. In this model spillovers lead to larger prices and profits.
Brod and Shivakumar (1999) consider a model in which firms choose their
R&D investments and production plans. They allow R&D to have spillovers and
show that an optimal antitrust policy strongly depends on the spillovers, since
for some values of the spillovers cooperation in production increases welfare and
decreases it for others.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: In section 2 we briefly
present the model. In section 3 we assume that there are no spillovers and briefly
provide three equilibria, one in which firms behave noncooperatively and those
two in which firms either semicollude on price or on advertising. In section 4 we
generalize the model of the previous section and allow for spillovers. Again we
derive symmetric equilibria for all cases. Section 5 concludes. The proofs can
be found in Appendix C.
4.2 The Model
We assume two firms (i=1,2) and a unit mass of consumers with unit demand.
The firms are assumed to set prices. We allow firms to have mixed pricing
strategies and denote the random variable by Pi and its realization by pi for
i = 1, 2. Let Fi(pi) = Prob(Pi < pi) denote the c.d.f. of the pricing strategy of
firm i with lower bound p
i
and upper bound p¯i. We assume all consumers to
gain no utility from consuming the good. Moreover, consumers are assumed to
be completely informed about the prices charged. However, the firms can ad-
vertise to persuade the consumers to buy the good. More precisely, all receivers
of an advertisement of firm i change their preferences for good i to V . The
consumers, who have not perceived the advertisement of firm i, do not change
their preferences for good i. Hence, all consumers who have only received an
advertisement from one firm have different valuations for the two goods and
consumers have therefore heterogenous preferences ex post.
The firms choose their adverting intensities 0 ≤ φ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ φ2 ≤ 1,
which are assumed to be stochastically independent. Then the market looks as
follows: a fraction of (1 − φ1)(1 − φ2) does not receive any advertisement; the
fraction φ1(1−φ2) does only receive an advertisement from firm 1; the fraction
(1 − φ1)φ2 does only receive an advertisement from firm 2; and the fraction
φ1φ2 receives both advertisements. The costs of advertising are assumed to be
convex and are given by the function A(φi) = aφ
2
i
2 for i = 1, 2. We restrict
the parameters to a > V2 to ensure that firms choose advertising intensities
less than one in each of the equilibria considered. Moreover, we evaluate the
welfare. Since valuations for the goods are different ex-ante and ex-post (before
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and after advertising), we have to decide which valuations we choose for the
welfare comparison. Using ex-ante valuations would never lead to a positive
consumer surplus. Moreover, it becomes negative if at least a positive mass of
consumers buys the good for a price larger zero. To avoid negative measures for
the consumer surplus we use ex-post valuation for welfare comparison. Hence,
we define the welfare as the sum of the consumer rents and the industry profits
using ex-post valuations of the consumers.
4.2.1 Sequence of Action
We suppose a three stage game. In the first stage the firms simultaneously
decide about their advertising intensity. In the second stage the firms observe
the advertising intensity of their competitor and simultaneously decide about
the price they charge for the good. In the last stage the consumer receive their
advertisements, observe the prices and make their purchasing decisions. Then,
the firms receive their profits.
4.2.2 Alternative Model: Informative Advertising
The model we are going to analyze can also be replaced by a model of incomplete
information and informative advertising. That is, we have to assume that all
consumers have a valuation V for both goods, but do not have any information
about the exact locations of the firms. Suppose that it is too expensive for
the consumers to do undirected search. However, directed search is costless.
Hence, without becoming informed about the exact location of a firm, they are
not willing to search for it. Therefore, the firms have to inform the consumers
about their location. We assume that firms’ advertising informs the consumers
about their existence. A consumer who receives an advertisement knows about
the existence of the firm and which price it charges. It can easily be verified
that this model will have the same equilibria.
4.3 The Benchmark Case: No Spillovers
We want to establish symmetric subgame perfect equilibria for the three different
cases.
We solve this game by backward induction. The purchasing decisions is
trivial. All consumers who have not received an advertisement, do not buy any
good for any price p > 0. The consumers who have received an advertisement
from only one firm, buy at this firm if the price is less than the valuation, V .
The consumers who have received both advertisements compare the prices of
both firms and buy at the cheaper one. Provided that Fi(·) is continuous for
78 RANDOM PRICING, INFORMATION AND ADVERTISING
i = 1, 2, the expected profits of firm i by setting price p and advertising intensity
φi are given by
Πi(p, φi) = p {φi(1− φj) + φiφj [1− Fj(p)]} − aφ
2
i
2 for i = 1, 2 given p ≤ V.
(4.1)
The expected sales consists of two parts: the expected number of consumers
who have received only an advertisement from firm i and the expected sales to
consumers who have received advertisements from both firms. However, those
who have received both advertisements buy only at firm i if the price charged by
firm i is lower than that of firm j, which happens with probability [1− Fj(p)].
Suppose both firms use pricing distribution without mass points. Since we
want to establish a symmetric equilibrium, we know that F1 = F2 ≡ F . Then
we can establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. In any symmetric equilibrium, in which both firms use continuous
pricing distributions, p¯ = V holds.
In any symmetric equilibrium, a firm i charging the upper bound, only sells
to consumers who have received only received an advertisement from firm i only.
Thus, it it is optimal for the firms to exploit all those consumers by setting the
price equal to the consumers’ valuation.
4.3.1 Noncooperative Equilibrium
We now treat the advertising choices φ1 and φ2 as fixed and let the firms choose
their prices optimally. Intuitively, in a symmetric equilibrium in which firms
use atomless pricing strategies, a firm which charges the upper bound p¯, sells to
consumers, who have received both advertisements, with probability zero. Given
that the pricing distributions do not have mass points, the expected profits of
firm i are fixed by
Πi(p, φi) = p {φi(1− φj) + φiφj [1− Fj(p)]}− aφ
2
i
2 = V φi(1− φj)− a
φ2i
2 (4.2)
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2.
We can establish the following symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. There exists a symmetric equilibrium with φ1 = φ2 ≡ φ∗ in
which the firms choose an advertising intensity
φ∗ = V
V + a (4.3)
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and set prices according to the pricing strategy
F ∗i (p) = 1−
V − p
p
· 1− φi
φi
. (4.4)
on the support [(1 − φi)V, V ] for i = 1, 2. On the equilibrium path the expected
profits are given by
Πi =
a
2 ·
(
V
V + a
)2
(4.5)
for i = 1, 2 and the welfare is given by
W = V
2
a+ V . (4.6)
The expected profits of the derived equilibrium are increasing in V and in
a. The pricing distribution on the equilibrium path are given by
Fi(p) = 1− V − p
p
· a
V
and is decreasing in a. Moreover, the upper bound is increasing in a. Thus,
price competition decreases in a, which enhances the expected profits of the
firms.
Both firms choose a smaller advertising intensity if it advertising becomes
more expensive. Thus, there are nearly no consumers who have received two
advertisements if a is large. Consequently, there is only little price competition
in the second stage. On the contrary, if a is close to zero, both firms choose a
large advertising intensity and nearly all consumers receive both advertisements,
which leads to an intensive price competition and thus lowers expected profits.
In the equilibrium, all consumers who have received an advertisement buy
the good, since prices do not exceed V . Hence, the total welfare is simply given
by the total number of informed consumers multiplied by V deducted by the
total costs for advertising. The total welfare is increasing in the valuation V
and decreasing in the costs of advertising a.
4.3.2 Equilibrium with Semicollusion on Price
We now want to derive a symmetric equilibrium when firms collude on prices
but set their advertising intensities noncooperatively. When firms collude on
the price, they set the monopoly price, which is given by V . Thus, they abstain
from competing about the consumers who have received both advertisements to
extract the complete rents of any receiver. Assuming that indifferent consumers
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choose each firm with probability of 12 , their expected profits from advertising
become
ΠPCi (φi) =
[
φi(1− φj) + φiφj2
]
V − aφ
2
i
2 (4.7)
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2.
We can derive the following symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2. If firms semicollude on prices, there exists a symmetric equi-
librium with φ1 = φ2 ≡ φPC in which both firms set price pPC = V and choose
an advertising intensity equal to
φPC = 2V
V + 2a. (4.8)
On the equilibrium path the expected profits are given by
ΠPCi =
2aV 2
(V + 2a)2 . (4.9)
for i = 1, 2 and the welfare is given by
WPC = 4aV
2
(V + 2a)2 . (4.10)
Since all consumers have zero rents, the welfare in this equilibrium is sim-
ply the aggregate of the expected profits of the two firms. As expected, the
expected profits and welfare are increasing in the valuation, V , and decreasing
in the advertising costs. We compare this equilibrium with the noncooperative
equilibrium of the previous subsection below.
4.3.3 Equilibrium with Semicollusion on Advertising
In this subsection, we suppose that firms set prices non-cooperatively, but ad-
vertising intensities are chosen to maximize expected industry profits.
The expected profits from noncooperative price setting are given in function
(4.2). Thus, the expected industry profits in a symmetric equilibrium with
φ1 = φ2 ≡ φ are given by
ΠAC = Π1(φ1) + Π2(φ2) = V φ1(1− φ2)− aφ
2
1
2 + V φ2(1− φ1)− a
φ22
2
= 2V φ− (2V + a)φ2. (4.11)
We can now derive the symmetric equilibrium with semicollusion on advertising.
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Proposition 4.3. If firms semicollude on advertising, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium with φ1 = φ2 ≡ φAC in which firms choose advertising intensity
φAC = V2V + a (4.12)
and charge prices according to the atomless pricing strategy given by
FACi (p) = 1−
V − p
p
· 1− φi
φi
(4.13)
on the support [(1− φi)V, a] and i = 1, 2. On the equilibrium path the expected
profits are given by
ΠACi =
V 2
2(2V + a) . (4.14)
for i = 1, 2 and the welfare is given by
W = (3V + a)
(
V
2V + a
)2
. (4.15)
In contrast to Simbanegavi (2009), in which expected profits are increasing in
a when firms semicollude on advertising, the expected profits are here decreasing
in a. Simbanegavi (2009) decomposes the effect of an increase in a into a direct
effect, which means that the firm have higher costs, and into a strategic effect,
which means that the firms will lower their advertising intensity if a increases. In
contrast to Simbanegavi (2009), the strategic effect does not outweigh the direct
effect an thus the firms have lower profits. Moreover, the pricing distribution
on the equilibrium path is given by
Fi = 1− V − p
p
· V + a
V
for i = 1, 2. Thus, larger a leads to larger prices and smaller consumer rents.
Therefore, welfare is decreasing in a. Clearly, it is increasing in V .
4.3.4 Full Collusion
We now want to derive the equilibrium when firms fully collude. That is, they
cooperate in advertising and pricing. Clearly, the firms set the monopoly price
V . Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium with φ1 = φ2 ≡ φ the industry profits are
given by
ΠFC = 2 ·
{
V
[
φ(1− φ) + φ
2
2
]
− a2φ
2
}
= V (2φ− φ2)− aφ2 (4.16)
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And thus, we have the following equilibrium.
Proposition 4.4. If firms cooperate in advertising and pricing, there exists a
symmetric equilibrium in which firms set price pFC = V and choose an adver-
tising intensity
φFC = V
V + a. (4.17)
On the equilibrium path the profits are given by
ΠFCi =
V 2
2(V + a) (4.18)
and welfare is given by
WFC = V
2
V + a. (4.19)
Interestingly, the firms set the same advertising intensity as when they do
not cooperate. Thus, the resulting welfare is the same. However, there is no
consumer rent in this equilibrium.
4.3.5 Comparison of the Equilibria
First we want to compare the equilibrium advertising intensities in the different
equilibria.
Proposition 4.5. The firms’ advertising intensities in the different equilibria
can be ranked as follows: φPC > φ∗ = φFC > φAC .
It is remarkable that firms choose the same advertising intensity if they do
not cooperate than under full cooperation. That is, even though the firms gain
market power through advertising, they choose the welfare maximizing advertis-
ing intensity.6 The rationale for the first inequality is that the expected profits
from any additional attracted consumer are higher under price collusion than if
firms behave noncooperatively. Thus, the firms have a larger incentive to attract
additional consumers via advertising. However, if firms collude on advertising,
they collude on low advertising levels to avoid an intensive price competition
in the second stage. Hence, they forgo additional consumers to achieve larger
(expected) prices in the second stage. This is established in the next Proposi-
tion, where P ∗, PPC , PAC and PFC denote the random equilibrium price in
the noncooperative equilibrium, the equilibrium with price semicollusion, the
equilibrium with advertising semicollusion and the full collusion equilibrium,
respectively.
6That is, the firms are led by the invisible hand.
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Proposition 4.6. The expected prices on the equilibrium path of the different
equilibria can be ranked as follows: E[P ∗] ≤ E[PAC ] ≤ E[PPC ] = E[PFC ] = V .
Clearly, the firms charge the highest price if they collude on prices, since they
charge the monopoly price (reservation price). Since firms restrict advertising
under advertising collusion to ease price competition, the prices with semicol-
lusion on advertising is larger than if they behave completely noncooperatively.
However, even if the firms charge the largest price and sell most under price
semicollusion it does not imply that it is the most profitable one for the firms,
since advertising costs are convex. The next results examines this.
Proposition 4.7. We can rank the expected profits on the equilibrium path as
follows: ΠFCi > ΠPCi > ΠACi > Π∗i .
As expected, full collusion is most profitable for the firms. Moreover, semicol-
lusion is always preferred by the firms to noncooperation since they can reduce
price competition either directly or indirectly through advertising. The reason
why the advertising costs must be sufficiently large for price semicollusion to be
more profitable than advertising semicollusion is that firms advertise too much
under price semicollusion relative to full collusion. Large advertising costs re-
duce the advertising levels and hence make the collusion more efficient (see also
Simbanegavi (2009) for this effect).
Proposition 4.8. Noncooperation and full cooperation lead to the largest wel-
fare. Semicollusion is always detrimental to welfare. Moreover, the welfare is
larger if firms semicollude on pricing than on advertising if V is sufficiently
large and a is sufficiently small and vice versa.
Since firms choose the same advertising intensity if they do not cooperate
than when they fully collude, the welfare is the same in both scenarios and it is
the maximum welfare. However, under full collusion there is no consumer rent.
Moreover, the firm’s advertising intensity is larger under price collusion than in
the non-cooperative (or the full collusion) outcome. The fraction of consumers
that are additionally reached under price semicollusion do not compensate for
the increase in advertisement cost. The opposite is the case if firms semicollude
on advertising. The reduction of advertising costs does not exceed the loss of
consumers. Moreover, if the advertising costs are low (or if valuations are large),
the loss of welfare, caused by the large advertising costs if firms semicollude on
price, is lower than the loss of consumers caused by the reduction in advertising
if firms semicollude on advertising.
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4.3.6 Summary
The main results of the model are equivalent to the findings with informa-
tive advertising by Simbanegavi (2009). These are the following: (i) welfare is
maximized if firms fully collude and if they behave noncooperatively; (ii) semi-
collusion is detrimental to welfare; (iii) if V > a holds, the welfare loss is larger
if firms semicollude on advertising; (iv) the firms’ benefit from cooperation and
the profits are the largest if the fully collude and price semicollusion is more prof-
itable than advertising semicollusion; (v) the advertising intensities are largest
if firms semicollude on price and lowest if firms semicollude on advertising. An
explanation for these parallels with the findings of Simbanegavi (2009) is that
this model can also be interpreted as a model with informative advertising.
In the model of Aluf and Shy (2001) in which the firms’ advertising is per-
suasive the advertising intensities increase if firms semicollude on advertising.
The difference of this behavior follows from the difference of the advertising
technology. In our model, the valuation for the good is binary. In Aluf and Shy
(2001) the valuation has continuous values and can be changed farther more
if a firm spends more on advertising. Consequently, in Aluf and Shy (2001)
the firms gain more market power over some consumers and can charge higher
prices. Thus, firms increase the advertising intensity to weaken price competi-
tion. In our model, price competition increases in the advertising intensities for
any φ > 0 as can be easily seen by the equilibrium pricing strategies. That is, the
firms find it more interesting to compete for the consumers who have perceived
advertisements of both firms. Thus, firms are willing to cooperate to reduce the
advertising intensities with the aim of weakening the price competition.
4.4 Advertising with Spillovers
Until now, we have assumed that a firm can persuade consumers only through
its own advertising activity. In the model above, any advertising of a firm per-
suades the receivers only of the firm’s good, but does not change the preference
for the competitor’s good. However, it is plausible that receivers of advertise-
ment do not become persuaded from the product of one particular firm but
for all products in one particular market. Therefore, we relax this assumption
and allow a fraction of the receivers of a firm’s advertisement to change the
preferences for the competitor’s good too. That is, any consumer who has only
received the advertisement of firm i has valuation V only for good i with prob-
ability 0 ≤ 1− η ≤ 1 and has valuation V for both goods with probability η for
i = 1, 2. Therefore, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 measures the level of the spillovers. Note, that
this is an extreme form of spillovers. A consumer who has received only one
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advertisement may have the same high valuation for both goods. Moreover, the
spillovers do not have any direct welfare effect. If a consumer is once persuaded
by one firm, it does not add anything to welfare if the consumer has also high
valuation for the other good, since we assumed unit demand. However, there
are indirect welfare effects, since spillovers change the equilibrium strategies.
Provided that Fj(·) is continuous, the expected profits of firm i become
Πi(p, φi) = p{φi(1− φj)(1− η)
+ [φiφj + [φi(1− φj) + (1− φi)φj ]η] · [1− Fj(p)]} − aφ
2
i
2
(4.20)
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2 given p ≤ V . The first term of the expected profits
represents the expected revenues. The expected sales consist of two parts. The
first term is the expected fraction of consumers who exclusively have valuation V
for good i. These consumers have received one advertisement only (which is from
firm i). This fraction of consumers buys the good at any price provided it does
not exceed V . The second part represents the expected consumers who do price
comparison. One part of these consumers has only received one advertisement,
but are also willing to buy the other good. More precisely, a fraction η of those
who have only received an advertisement of one firm. The other part of these
consumers has received both advertisements and compare prices (analogous to
the previous chapter).
We restrict parameters to a > V (1−η)2 . This ensures the existence of a
symmetric equilibrium in the case of price semicollusion.
4.4.1 Noncooperative Equilibrium
Given the advertising intensities φ1, φ2, all prices possibly charged in equilibrium
must yield the same expected profits. In the symmetric equilibrium in which
firms use continuous pricing distributions, we can apply Lemma 4.1, which holds
for the case with spillovers as well. Thus, we obtain for any optimal price of
firm i, that the expected profits are given by
Π+i (p, φi) = V [φi(1− φj)(1− η)]− a
φ2i
2 . (4.21)
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2. We are now able to establish the equilibrium if firms do
not cooperate.
Proposition 4.9. There exists a noncooperative symmetric equilibrium with
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φ1 = φ2 ≡ φ+, in which the firms choose advertising intensities
φ+ = (1− η) V(1− η)V + a (4.22)
and use the atomless pricing strategy
F+i (p) = 1−
(V − p)φi(1− φj)(1− η)
p{φiφj + [φi(1− φj) + (1− φi)φj ]η} (4.23)
on the support
[
(1−η)φi(1−φj)
φi+(1−φi)φjη V, V
]
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2. On the equilibrium
path the expectd profits are given by
Π+i =
a
2
(
(1− η)V
(1− η)V + a
)2
(4.24)
for i = 1, 2 and the welfare is
W+ = (1− η)V 2 (1− η)V + (1 + η)a[(1− η)V + a]2 . (4.25)
Both are decreasing in the spillovers.
Given any advertising intensity of the firms, the expected fraction of price
insensitive consumers of firm i are given by φi(1−φj)(1−η) and thus decreasing
in the spillovers. That is, advertising is a less powerful tool to acquire pricing
power when spillovers are large and hence price competition in the second stage
is larger. That is, F+(p) is increasing in η and the lower bound is decreasing in
η for any given φi and φj . Formally, we have
∂2Π+i (p, φi)
∂φi∂η
= −V (1− φj) < 0.
Therefore, the firms equilibrium advertising intensities are decreasing in the
spillovers.
Since the spillovers lead to a more intensive price competition, the expected
profits are decreasing in the spillovers. Moreover, the reduction of the adver-
tising intensities due to larger spillovers is welfare deterring. Furthermore, the
expected profits and the welfare converge to zero, if η → 1. That is, the firms
do not advertise if η = 1. Intuitively, advertising becomes a useless instrument
to acquire pricing power, since all receivers do price comparison and thus the
Bertrand outcome arises for any combination of φi and φj .
This is in sharp contrast to the findings of Nakata (2006) who find expected
profits to be increasing in the spillovers. In Nakata’s model, a more advanta-
geous spillover effect (for the firms) is assumed. More precisely, the spillovers
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from the competitor’s advertising are a perfect substitute for a firm’s advertis-
ing investment.7 In our model, this is not the case, since all consumers who are
additionally persuaded via the spillover effect compare prices. Not all of these
consumers compare prices in Nakata’s model.
4.4.2 Equilibrium with Semicollusion on Price
If the two firms collude on the price but choose their advertising strategy nonco-
operatively, the equilibrium collusion price is p+PC = V . Assuming that every
firm attracts one half of the consumers who are persuaded of both goods, the
expected profits of firm i become
Π+PCi (φi) = V
{
φi(1− φj)(1− η) + φiφj + [φi(1− φj) + (1− φi)φj ]η2
}
− aφ
2
i
2
(4.26)
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2. Hence, we can establish the following equilibrium.
Proposition 4.10. There exists a symmetric equilibrium with φ1 = φ2 ≡ φ+PC
in which the firms collude on prices and choose advertising noncooperatively.
The equilibrium price is p+PC = V and the equilibrium advertising intensities
are given by
φ+PC = (2− η) V
V + 2a. (4.27)
On the equilibrium path the expected profits are
Π+PCi =
(2− η)V 2
2(V + 2a)2 [ηV + (2 + η)a] (4.28)
for i = 1, 2 and the welfare is given by
W+PC = (2− η)V
2
(V + 2a)2 [ηV + (2 + η)a]. (4.29)
Both are increasing in the spillovers if η ≤ VV+a holds and decreasing otherwise.
Thus, also in the price semicollusion the optimal advertising intensities are
decreasing in the spillovers. This effect is due to the externality caused by adver-
tising of the competing firm. For any given η, advertising is large if advertising
costs are low or the valuation, V , is large. If there are no spillovers, η = 0,
then each of the firms attracts the consumers who have positive valuation for
their good only and half of those who have positive valuation for both8. If the
7Nakata (2006) assumes linear costs and a concave advertising technology, which is φi =
min{
√
aqi + bq−i, 1}, where qi is firm i’s advertising investment and q−i are the advertising
investments of all other firms. Thus, b > 0 measures the spillover effect.
8Those consumers have actually received both advertisements.
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spillovers increase, two effects lower the incentive of advertising. A larger η
lowers the fraction of consumers who have positive valuation for one good only,
which is φi(1− φj)(1− η). The other φi(1− φj)η are shared equally among the
firms. The second effect is caused by the competitor. Given any strategy of firm
j, a fraction φjη of the consumers has already changed its valuation for good i
to V . Thus, it is of no value for firm i to address these consumers. Thus, the
competitor causes a positive externality. Hence, the fraction of consumers who
are worth to approach with the advertisement reduces to [1 − φjη]. Formally,
we have
∂2Π+PC(φi)
∂φi∂η
= −V2 < 0.
The expected profits of both firms are positive for any spillovers. The welfare
is given by the industry profits, since the firms exploit the consumers completely.
For small spillovers, the welfare increases in the spillovers. To give a rationale for
this, consider no spillovers, η = 0. Then, the firms advertise more aggressively
under price collusion than they do when they do not cooperate and hence the
advertising intensity exceeds the social optimal level (see Proposition 4.5 and
4.8). Moreover, firm’s advertising intensities are decreasing in the spillovers
when firms semicollude on prices. This indicates that the advertising intensities
are inefficiently high when spillovers are low, but increasing spillovers lead to
more efficiency when η < VV+a . In contrast to the noncooperative case, the
expected profits and welfare do not converge to zero when η → 1. The rationale
is that price cooperation prevents the firm from Bertrand-competition and thus
advertising is still a beneficial instrument to acquire additional customers even
though they are shared equally among the firms.
4.4.3 Equilibrium with Semicollusion on Advertising
We can again apply Lemma 4.1, since it holds for the case with spillovers as
well. Thus, the pricing subgames are the as in the noncooperative scenario.
Moreover, for continuous Fi(·) for i = 1, 2, the expected profits can also be
represented by expression (4.21). We can establish the following equilibrium.
Proposition 4.11. There exists a symmetric equilibrium with φ1 = φ2 ≡ φ+AC
in which firms semicollude on advertising, in which firms set advertising inten-
sity
φ+AC = (1− η)V2(1− η)V + a (4.30)
and use the pricing strategy
F+i (p) = 1−
(V − p)φi(1− φj)(1− η)
p{φiφj + [φi(1− φj) + (1− φi)φj ]η} (4.31)
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on the support
[
(1−η)φi(1−φj)
φi+(1−φi)φjη V, V
]
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2. On the equilibrium
path, the expected profits are given by
Π+ACi =
(1− η)2V 2
2[2(1− η)V + a] . (4.32)
for i = 1, 2 and the welfare is given by
W+AC = (1− η)V 2 3(1− η)V + (1 + η)a[2(1− η)V + a]2 (4.33)
Both are decreasing in the spillovers.
The equilibrium advertising intensity decreases in the spillovers when firms
semicollude on advertising. The reasons are the same as in the noncooperative
case. Since the profit functions are equivalent with the noncooperative case, we
also have ∂
2Πi(p,φi)
∂φi∂η
= −V (1 − φj) < 0. Since larger spillovers lead to a larger
fraction of consumers who are persuaded from both goods, larger spillovers
lead to a stronger price competition in the second stage. Consequently, the
industry reduces the advertising levels to compensate for this. Moreover, larger
spillovers lead to smaller expected profits. Since advertising intensities decrease
if spillovers increase, fewer consumers receive advertisements. This increases
the inefficiency due to low advertising. Moreover, similar to the noncooperative
case, the expected profits and welfare converge to zero when η → 1, because of
the same intuition.
4.4.4 Full Collusion
If firms cooperate in pricing and advertising, then they set price equal to p+FC =
V and thus the industry profit function becomes
Π+FC = V
(
2φ− φ2)− aφ2.
This function is independent of the spillovers η and equivalent to the profit
function if there are no spillovers, ΠFCi , given in equation (4.16). Moreover, the
industry profits represent the welfare. Thus, the equilibrium with spillovers is
completely described by Proposition 4.4. That is, the full collusion completely
internalizes the external effect caused by the spillovers.
4.4.5 Firms’ Behavior and Expected Profits
The firms reduce their advertising intensities when spillovers become larger.
The intuition is that advertising becomes a less effective instrument to acquire
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market power. The next proposition establishes the ranking of the advertising
intensities.
Proposition 4.12. The advertising intensities fulfill φ+AC < φ+ < φFC ≤
φ+PC if 0 < η ≤ VV+a and φ+AC ≤ φ+ < φ+PC < φFC if VV+a < η ≤ 1.
This proposition establishes that the ranking of the advertising intensities
in which firms compete in at least one strategic dimension does not change.
It is remarkable, that the reduction of the advertising intensities under price
semicollusion is so large, that the firms choose too large advertising intensities
for low spillovers, the efficient advertising intensity if η = VV+a and too low
intensities when spillovers are large.
It can easily be seen that the expected profits under full competition, (4.24),
and advertising semicollusion, (4.32), converge to zero when η approaches one,
whereas the expected profits under price semicollusion in (4.28) remain posi-
tive. However, the next proposition establishes that the ranking of the expected
profits is independent from the level of spillovers.
Proposition 4.13. The expected profits can be ranked as follows: Π+i ≤ Π+ACi <
Π+PCi ≤ ΠFCi
If there are no spillovers, firms advertise too much in the price semicollusion.
However, as firms decrease their advertising intensity when spillovers increase
they achieve larger expected profits (and reach the maximum level at η = VV+a
at which ΠFC = ΠPC). For larger spillovers the profits of the price semicollusion
decrease. Nevertheless, price semicollusion is more profitable for the firms than
advertising semicollusion for any level of spillovers. As expected, the firms prefer
any cooperation to the noncooperative scenario. Only if η = 1 φ+AC = φ+ = 0
and thus profits are zero in these two scenarios.
4.4.6 Welfare Analysis and Policy Implications
If advertising has no spillovers, semicollusion is detrimental to welfare and
should therefore be monitored and prohibited by antitrust authorities (see the
analysis above for persuasive advertising or Simbanegavi (2009) for informative
advertising). However, with spillovers this does not necessarily persist, since
firms might be able to internalize the external effects from spillovers. We now
compare the three scenarios in which firms do not fully collude. First, one can
note that price collusion approaches the maximum welfare if η → VV+a - Thus,
W+(η)−W+PC(η) and W+AC(η)−W+PC(η) decrease in the spillovers if the
spillovers are small and are negative at η = VV+a . Furthermore, since the adver-
tising intensities φ+ and φ+AC are inefficiently low and φ+ > φ+AC holds for
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all levels of spillovers, W+ > W+AC must hold. That is, we can establish the
following result.
Proposition 4.14. The welfare is (i) larger under noncooperative behavior than
if firms collude on advertising; (ii) larger under price semicollusion than under
noncooperation when spillovers are large enough and vice versa; (iii) larger un-
der price semicollusion than under advertising semicollusion when spillovers are
large enough and vice versa.
Thus, price semicollusion is preferable to the other two scenarios when
spillovers are large enough. Without spillovers, the advertising intensity is too
large when firms semicollude on the price. However, the spillovers lower the
incentive to advertise. This lowers the equilibrium intensities in all scenarios.
Therefore, the price semicollusion becomes more efficient and for η = VV+a it
becomes welfare maximizing, whereas the advertising intensities in the other
two scenarios create less welfare for increasing spillovers. Moreover, if spillovers
are large enough such that η > V V + a we have φ+AC ≤ φ+ < φ+PC < φFC =
V
V+a . The result follows from the fact that the welfare is increasing in the
advertising intensity for φ < VV+a .
This implies in our specific model that antitrust authorities should not en-
force noncooperative behavior if there are large spillovers in advertising. Our
analysis suggests that authorities should motivate price cooperation. Moreover,
our analysis has shown that cooperation in advertising only yields a lower wel-
fare than noncooperative behavior for all levels of spillovers and should therefore
be intensively be monitored.
4.5 Conclusion
We have shown that the equilibrium behavior of the firms depend strongly on
the underlying spillovers. Moreover, spillovers are decisive to determine the
optimal antitrust policy. In our specific model with unit demand, a complete
collusion maximizes the welfare and can internalize the external effect caused
by the spillovers. It is remarkable that the firms choose the welfare maximizing
advertising intensities also if they do not cooperate when there are no spillovers.
If the spillovers increase, advertising becomes a less powerful instrument to
acquire pricing power since. Thus, firms lower their advertising intensities. That
is, increasing spillovers can ease advertising wars, but can enforce underinvest-
ments in advertising. In the extreme case in which spillovers are extremely large,
advertising becomes a worthless tool for firms when there is price competiton.
Thus, they completely abstain from advertising. Therefore, spillovers lead to
lower expected profits and lower welfare when firms choose too low advertising
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intensities (compared with the efficient choice under full collusion). That is the
case when firms do not cooperate and when they semicollude on advertising.
However, the consequences when firms semicollude on the price are contrary.
Since the advertising level is too large when there are no spillovers (and hence
too costly), the reduction of the advertising levels due to spillovers makes the
collusion more profitable and more efficient. Furthermore both approach their
maximum when spillovers are low. For large spillovers the advertising intensi-
ties are under the efficient level and thus spillovers reduce welfare and expected
profits.
The most striking result is that for large enough spillovers price semicollsuion
yields a larger welfare than the other two scenarios with competition. Thus, our
model implies that antitrust authorities should consider spillovers to determine
their optimal policy. In particular, it should motivate price cooperation for large
spillovers. Moreover, price semicollusion is the most profitable cooperation for
firms. Nevertheless, firms generically choose Pareto inefficient advertising levels.
Advertising semicollusion creates less welfare than noncooperation for all levels
of spillovers. Thus, our model implies that advertising choices of firms should
be heavily monitored by the authorities so that cooperation in advertising can
be avoided.
4.A Proofs
4.A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. Let F be the equilibrium advertising distribution with upper bound p¯ and
suppose it has no mass points. Moreover, let φ be the equilibrium advertising
intensity. It is obvious that prices above V cannot be optimal, since they lead
to zero sales. Hence, we only have to show, that p¯ < V is suboptimal. Suppose
that p¯ < V . The expected profits of the firms are given by p¯(1−φ)(φ)−aφ2 , since
by charging p¯ firm i only sells to consumers who have received an advertisement
only from firm i. However, there exists an  > 0 small enough such that p¯+ ≤ V
such that (p¯+ )(1− φ)(φ)− aφ2 > p¯(1− φ)(φ)− aφ2 . Hence, p¯ < V cannot be
optimal and the only remaining candidate is p¯ = V .
4.A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. From condition 4.2 we can express the optimal pricing strategy, which is
Fj(p) = 1− V − p
p
· 1− φj
φj
.
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For the lower bound Fj(p) = 0 must hold. Hence, we obtain the lower bound
p
j
= V (1− φj).
The expected profits are given by
Πi(φi) = V φi(1− φj)− aφ
2
i
2
for i = 1, 2. The first order condition is
∂Π(φi)
∂φi
= V (1− φj)− aφi = 0
which gives the best response of firm i
φ∗i (φj) =
V
a
(1− φj) for i = 1, 2.
Since we want to establish a symmetric equilibrium, we have φi = φj ≡ φ. We
can insert this into the best response function and solve for φ. This yields the
optimal advertising intensity
φ∗ = V
V + a.
Inserting φ∗ = φi = φj into the expected profits function above, yields the
equilibrium profits
Πi =
a
2 ·
(
V
V + a
)2
for i = 1, 2. Moreover, the welfare is given by the expected number of receivers
times their valuation subtracted by the total costs of advertising. This is
W = [2 · φ∗(1− φ∗) + (φ∗)2]V − 2 · a (φ
∗)2
2 = φ
∗[2V − (a+ V )φ∗] = V
2
a+ V .
4.A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. The first-order condition is then
∂Πi(φi)
∂φi
=
[
1− φj + φj2
]
V − aφi = 0
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and hence we obtain the best-response
φPCi (φj) =
V
a
(
1− φj2
)
of firm i on firm j’s advertising intensity for i 6= j and i = 1, 2. Hence, the
symmetric advertising intensity is given by
φPC = 2V
V + 2a.
The expected profits on the equilibrium path are given by
ΠPCi =
[
φPC −
(
φPC
)2
2
]
V − a
(
φPC
)2
2
= 2V
2
V + 2a − 2(V + a)
(
V
V + 2a
)2
= 2aV
2
(V + 2a)2
for i = 1, 2 and the welfare are given by the industry profits, since consumers
are completely exploited. That is,
WPC = 2 ·ΠPCi =
4aV 2
(V + 2a)2 .
4.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. The first order condition of the expected industry profits in 4.11 is given
by
∂ΠAC
∂φ
= 2V − 2φ(2V + a) = 0.
Hence, the optimal advertising intensity is
φAC = V2V + a
The expected profits on the equilibrium path are given by
ΠACi = V φAC(1− φAC)−
a
2
(
φAC
)2 = V 2 V + a2(2V + a)2 = V 22(2V + a)
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for i = 1, 2 and the welfare is given by
WAC =
[
2φAC − (φAC)2]V − 2a (φAC)22
= φAC
[
2V − (V + a)φAC]
= (3V + a)
(
V
2V + a
)2
.
4.A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. It is obvious that firms extract all rents from consumers if they cooperate
in prices by setting price equal to V . Then the firms choose their advertising
intensity to maximize industry profits. The first-order condition is given by
∂ΠFC
∂φ
= 2V − 2V φ− 2aφ = 0
and thus the optimal advertising fee is
φFC = V
V + a.
Therefore, the expected profits on the equilibrium path are given by
ΠFCi = V
(
φ− φ
2
2
)
− a2φ
2 = V
2
2(V + a)
and welfare is the sum of the industry profits.
4.A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.5
Proof. We have to show that ΦPC ≥ Φ∗. This is the case if 2VV+2a ≥ VV+a . After
multiplying by (V + a)(V +2a) we receive 2V 2 +2aV > V 2 +2aV , which holds
by the assumption that V > 0.
To establish the result, it is sufficient to show that the advertising intensity
under advertising collusion is smaller than the advertising intensity in the non-
cooperative outcome. That is, Φ∗ > ΦAC which is holds if VV+a >
V
2V+a .
Obviously, this is the case for all V > 0.
4.A.7 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof. To show that
∫ 1
0 pdF
AC(p) ≥ ∫ 10 pdF (p), it suffices to show that pAC ≥ p
and that FAC(·) dominates F (·). For the lower bounds aV+aV ≤ V+a2V+aV must
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hold. By dividing through V and multiplying both sides by (V + a)(2V + a)
we receive a(2V + a) ≤ (V + a)2. This holds if V 2 ≥ 0, which is the case by
assumption. To show that FAC(·) is dominated by F (·) we have to show that
1− V − p
p
· a
V
≥ 1− V − p
p
·
(
1 + a
V
)
holds. By subtracting one and dividing by −V−pp we receive aV ≤ 1 + aV .
Moreover, both expected prices cannot exceed the monopoly price V since
this presents the upper bound of both distributions.
4.A.8 Proof of Proposition 4.7
Proof. First, we show that on the equilibrium paths Πi < ΠACi , which is equiv-
alent to a2 ·
(
V
V+a
)2
< V
2
2(2V+a) ⇒ a(2V +a) < V 2 +a(2V +a). This holds since
V > 0.
Second, we show that on the equilibrium paths ΠPCi > ΠACi holds, which is
equivalent to 2a
(
V
V+2a
)2
> V
2
2(2V+a) ⇒ 8aV + 4a2 > V 2 + 4aV + 4a2 ⇒ 4aV >
V 2. Since a is bounded below, a > V2 , we have the following
4aV > 2V 2 > V 2
Thus, the inequality is satisfied and price semicollusion is always more profitable
than advertising semicollusion.
Moreover, we must have that full collusion is most profitable. Thus, we show
that V 22(V+a) >
2aV 2
(V+2a)2 . Multiplying by the denominators and dividing by V 2,
we receive (V + 2a)2 > 4a(V + a). It can easily be verified that this inequality
holds for all V > 0.
4.A.9 Proof of Proposition 4.8
Proof. First, we want to show that W ∗ = WFC > WPC holds. That is V 2V+a >
4aV 2
(V+2a)2 ⇒ (V + 2a)2 > 4a(V + a) which holds for any V > 0.
Second, we want to show that the welfare is larger when firms do not co-
operate (or fully cooperate) than when they semicollude on advertising. That
is, W ∗ = WFC > WAC(φAC) must hold, which can be rewritten as V 2a+V >
(3V + a)
(
V
2V+a
)2
⇒ (2V + a)2 > (3V + a)(a + V ). After multiplication and
cancellations one receives V 2 > 0, which holds by assumption.
Additionally, we have to show when WPC > WAC holds. Inserting the
optimal solution one receives (3V +a)
(
V
V+2a
)2
> 4aV
2
(V+2a)2 ⇒ (3V +a)(V +2a) >
4a(2V + a)2. After multiplication and cancellation we receive 3V 2(V − a) > 0,
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which is larger zero for V − a > 0. Since a is bounded below by V2 , we have
V − a < V − V2 = V2 > 0. Thus, WPC > WAC holds if V is sufficiently large
and a is sufficiently small and vice versa.
4.A.10 Proof of Proposition 4.9
Proof. Any price p charged in equilibrium must yield the same profits as the
upper bound V . Thus, we have the following
V [φi(1− φj)(1− η)]− aφ
2
i
2
= p {φi(1− φj)(1− η) + [φiφj + [φi(1− φj) + (1− φi)φj ]η] · [1− Fj(p)]} − aφ
2
i
2
for i 6= j, i = 1, 2 and p ≤ V . As above we can express from equation (4.21) the
pricing strategy
Fi(p) = 1− (V − p)φi(1− φj)(1− η)
p[φiφj + [φi(1− φj) + (1− φi)φj ]η]
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2.
The lower bound p fulfills F (p) = 0 and is therefore given by
p
i
= V (1− η)φi(1− φj)
φi + (1− φi)φjη
which completely describes the optimal pricing strategy. We now have to derive
the optimal advertising intensities. That is, we differentiate the expected profits
with respect to φi and set it equal to zero, which is
∂Πi(p, φi)
φi
= V (1− φj)(1− η)− aφi = 0.
Hence, the optimal response is given by
φi =
V (1− φj)(1− η)
a
.
For the symmetric equilibrium we look for a solution at which φi = φj . Thus,
we obtain
φ+ = (1− η) V
V (1− η) + a,
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which is less than one. The expected profits are given by
Π+i (φ+) = [φ+(1− φ+)(1− η)]V − a
(φ+)2
2
= (1− η)V φ+ −
{[
(1− η)V + a2
] (
φ+
)2}
= a2
(
(1− η)V
(1− η)V + a
)2
≥ 0.
The welfare is given by the expected number of receivers multiplied by their
valuation and subtracted by the total advertising costs.
W+ =V
[
2φ+ − (φ+)2]− 2 · a (φ+)22
=2V (1− η)
2V 2 + (1− η)aV
[(1− η)V + a]2 − (V + a)
(1− η)2V 2
[(1− η)V + a]2
=(1− η)V 2 (1− η)V + (1 + η)a[(1− η)V + a]2 .
We still have to show that the expected profits and the welfare are decreasing
in η. For this purpose one can rewrite the expression for the expected profits to
Π+i =
a
2
(
V
V + a1−η
)2
.
It is now obvious that ∂Π
+
i
∂η < 0. The welfare is given by
W+ = 2V φ+ − (V + a) (φ+)2
and it is increasing in φ for φ < VV+a . Since φ+ <
V
V+a and φ+ is decreasing in
η, the welfare is decreasing in η.
4.A.11 Proof of Proposition 4.10
Proof. Firm i chooses φi such that it maximizes the expected profits Π+PCi (φi).
The first-order condition is given by
∂Πi(φi)
∂φi
= V
[
(1− φj)(1− η) + φj + (1− 2φj)η2
]
− aφi = 0.
Therefore, the best-response function is given by
φ+PCi =
V
2a (2− φj − η) .
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The optimal choice in a symmetric equilibrium becomes
φ+PC = (2− η) V
V + 2a.
The expected profits in the symmetric equilibrium are given by
Π+PCi = V (1− η)φ+PC −
V + a
2
(
φ+PC
)2 = V 2 2− η2(V + 2a)2 [V η + a(2 + η)]
and are nonnegative. The welfare is equal to the industry profits and are given
by
W+PC = (2− η)V
2
(V + 2a)2 [V η + a(2 + η)].
We have to show that W+PC is increasing η for η < VV+a . The first derivative
is given by
∂W+PC
∂η
= 2V 2[V (1− η)− aη],
which is nonnegative if V (1− η)− aη ≥ 0. Rearranging this yields η ≤ VV+a . It
is easy to see that the same inequality must hold for Π+PCi being increasing in
η (since Π+PCi = W
+PC
2 ).
4.A.12 Proof of Proposition 4.11
Proof. The optimal pricing strategy is given in (4.23) on the support[
(1− η)φi(1− φj)
φi + (1− φi)φjη V, V
]
.
However, the advertising decisions are chosen as to maximize expected industry
profits, which are given by
ΠAC = 2V [φ(1− φ)(1− η)]− aφ2
for p ≤ V . Taking the derivative with respect to φ and setting it equal to zero
yields
∂Π+
∂φ
= 2V (1− η)− 4φV (1− η)− 2aφ = 0.
Hence, the optimal advertising strategy is
φ+AC = V (1− η)2V (1− η) + a.
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The expected profits are given by
Π+ACi = V [φ+AC(1− φ+AC)(1− η)]−
a
2
(
φ+AC
)2
= V (1− η)φ+AC −
(
V (1− η) + a2
) (
φ+AC
)2
= [V (1− η)]
2
2[2V (1− η) + a]2
for i 6= j and i = 1, 2 and are nonnegative for all values of a, V and η. The
welfare is given by
W+AC = 2V V (1− η)2V (1− η) + a − (V + a)
[
V (1− η)
2V (1− η) + a
]2
= V 2(1− η)3V (1− η) + a(1 + η)(2V (1− η) + a)2 .
We have to show that the expected profits Π+ACi and the welfare are in-
creasing in (1− η).
∂Π+ACi
∂η
= V 2(1− η) [−3V (1− η)− a][2V (1− η) + a] + 4V
2(1− µ)2 + 2aV (1− η)
[2V (1− η) + a]3
= −V 2(1− η)−2V
2(1− η)2 − 3aV (1− η)− a2)
[2V (1− η) + a]3 ≤ 0
The inequality follows from the parameters being larger zero. We know from
the proof of Proposition 4.9, that the expected welfare is increasing in the equi-
librium φAC for φ < VV+a . Since φAC decreases in η and we have φAC <
V
V+a ,
WAC decreases in φ.
4.A.13 Proof of Proposition 4.12
Proof. Since the advertising intensities φ+ and φ+AC are strictly decreasing
in η and by Proposition 4.5 we have φAC < φ∗ = φFC , we can immediately
conclude that φAC < φFC and φ∗ < φFC . Moreover, we have to show that
φ+PC = (2 − η) VV+2a > VV+2a = φ+FC for η > VV+a . This can be rearranged
to (2 − η)(V + a) > V + 2a. After multiplication and cancellation we receive
η > VV+a . Showing the opposite is straight forward.
Additionally, we have to show that φPC > φ+. That is (2 − η) VV+2a >
(1 − η) VV (1−η)+a .By multiplying by the denominators and dividing by V , we
recieve (2 − η)[V (1 − η) + a] > (1 − η)(V + 2a). After cancellation we obtain
(1− η)2V + ηa > 0
Moreover, we have to show that φ+ > φ+AC . That is, (1 − η) VV (1−η)+a >
V (1−η)
2V (1−η)+a ⇒ (1 − η)[2V (1 − η) + a] > (1 − η)[V (1 − η) + a], which is fulfilled
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for any V > 0. It follows immediately that φ+PC > φ+AC .
4.A.14 Proof of Proposition 4.13
Proof. The welfare
W = 2V φ− (V + a)φ2
is increasing in φ for φ < VV+a and decreasing in φ for φ >
V
V+a . Under full
collusion and under price collusion the profits are equal to half of the welfare.
Since VV+a = φFC for all η and φ+PC =
V
V+a only at η =
V
V+a , we have
Π+PC ≤ Π+FC .
We have already shown in Proposition 4.11 that the profits are larger under
price collusion than under advertising collusion when there are no spillovers. If
η < VV+a , the expected profits under price semicollusion are increasing and they
are decreasing when firms semicollude on advertising. Thus, Π+PC > Π+AC for
η < VV+a . It remains to be shown that the inequality also holds for η >
V
V+a .
Under price semicollusion there are no consumer rents and the profits of a firm
is equal to half of the welfare. Moreover, welfare is increasing in φ < VV+a and
φ+AC < φ+PC < VV+a when η >
V
V+a . Thus, it follows that Π+AC < Π+PC .
We now show that Π+ ≤ Π+AC , which is equivalent to a2
(
(1−η)V
(1−η)V+a
)2
≤
[(1−η)V ]2
2[2(1−η)V+a] . Dividing by the nominator and multiplying by both denominators
yields a[2(1 − η)V + a] ≤ [(1 − η)V + a]2. Thus, it remains the inequality
(1− η)2V 2 ≥ 0 with equality only if η = 1.
4.A.15 Proof of Proposition 4.14
Proof. Result (i) follows from the fact that φ+AC ≤ φ+ < VV+a and by the fact
that the welfare is continuously increasing in φ for φ < VV+a .
Result (ii) follows from the fact that W+ is decreasing and W+PC is in-
creasing in η for η < VV+a and that W+PC approaches the maximum welfare.
For η > VV+a , we have φ+ < φ+PC <
V
V+a and the rest follows from the welfare
being continuously increasing in φ for φ < VV+a .
The welfare is increasing in η under price semicollusion if η < VV+a . More-
over, it is equal to the maximum welfare when η = VV+a . By the fact that
welfare decreases continuously under advertising semicollusion, there exist a
value ηˆ such that W+PC > W+AC for η ∈ (ηˆ, VV+a ]. It is left to show that
W+PC > W+AC for η > VV+a . The welfare is increasing in φ for φ <
V
V+a . The
result follows from φ+AC < φ+PC < VV+a for η >
V
V+a .
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Abstract
We set up models in which firms use random pricing strategies in the equilibria.
In the first model consumers are heterogenous in their costs of acquiring price
information. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which both firms
have positive profits when the costs of acquiring information are sufficiently
large for some consumers. This equilibrium can exist even if one firm has a
large advantage over its competitor. Moreover, there is a positive probability
that a low quality good is offered for a larger price than good of higher quality
when product differentiation is small and the consumer’s costs of information
are large.
In the second model, each firm has monopoly power over a local market.
However, they have the possibility to compete about a fraction of consumers in
the competitor’s market by advertising the product on price comparison website.
We show that the operator of the website (gatekeeper) benefits from firms having
asymmetric profitability. That is, the gatekeeper increases the advertising fee
when the advantage in the market increases. This lets the advertising intensities
drift apart and thus lowers price competition. Therefore, the gatekeeper can
extract larger rents from the firms.
In the third model, firms advertise to increase the valuation of consumers
and to gain market power. We show that semicollusion is welfare deterring
and that the full competition maximizes welfare when there are no spillovers
of advertising. Moreover, when spillovers are large enough price semicollusion
yields a larger welfare than advertising semicollusion or full competition. Thus,
antitrust policy should depend on the underlying spillovers and should allow for
price cooperation if spillovers are large.
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Zusammenfassung
Wir bilden Modelle in denen Firmen in den Gleichgewichten ihre Preise zufällig
wählen. Im ersten Modell haben Konsumenten ex-ante keine Information über
die Preise die von den Firmen im Markt gesetzt wurden. Für die Konsumenten
ist es kostspielig die Preisinformation zu erlangen. Wir zeigen die Existenz eines
Gleichgewichts, in dem die Firmen positive Profite haben. Dieses existiert auch,
wenn eine Firma einen kompetitiven Vorteil gegenüber, wenn die Information-
skosten der Konsumenten hoch. Darüber hinaus kann ein schlechteres Gut zu
einem höheren Preis angeboten werden als ein Besseres, wenn die Differenzierung
der Güter klein ist und die Informationskosten hoch sind.
Im zweiten Modell hat jede Firma Monopolmacht in einem lokalen Markt.
Durch die Existenz einer Preisvergleich-Website können die beiden Firmen je-
doch konkurrieren. Das heißt, der Betreiber der Website (Gatekeeper) setzt eine
Werbegebühr für die Firmen und die User der Website können kostenlaus auf
die Preislisten zugreifen. Der Gatekeeper erhöht die Werbegebühr wenn sich
der kompetitive Vorteil einer Firma vergrößert. Dadurch erhält die Firma mit
dem kompetitiven Vorteil eine größere Dominanz auf der Website des Gatekeep-
ers, was verringert der Preiswettkampf verliert an Intensivität. Dadurch kann
der Gatekeeper einen größeren Anteil der erhöhten Umsätze der dominierenden
Firma extrahieren.
Im dritten Modell bewerben Firmen ihr Produkt um die Zahlungswilligkeit
der Konsumenten zu erhöhen und dadurch Marktmacht zu generieren. Wir
zeigen, dass Semikollusion den Wohlstand verringert und dass eine volle Kollu-
sion den Wohlstand maximiert, wenn Werbung keine externen Effekte hat. Sind
die externen Effekte jedoch groß genug, dann ist erhöht Preissemikollusion den
Wohlstand. Daher ist die größe der externen Effekte ausschlaggebend für eine
optimale Kartellgesetzgebung. So sollte Werbungssemikollusion immer verhin-
dert werden. Jedoch sollte eine Preissemikollusion gefördert werden, wenn die
externen Effekte groß genug sind.
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